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FOREWORD i_ ,..
This document completely ',pdatesand consolidates the results 1 :
I of three previous studies to compile, interpret, and analyze orbital _I ""
reliability data on U.S. _pacecraft. Both the earlier studies and this I _"
I update were performed by Planning Research Corporation (PRC). The first I
study was conducted from 13 May 1966 to 3 March 1967 for the Apollo
l Support Department of the General Electric Company in cooperation with _.,
Headquarters, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The i .l 1
second and third studies were part of a larger effort for the Navy ! ..
I Space Systems Activity; they reported on work conducted from " I :!
l November 1970 to 30 November 1971, and from 1 December 1971 to _
I _
30 November 1972. This update was prepared for NASA Headquarters. _ .
l Mr. Abe Moskovitz was the Technical Monitor. This work was
performed under contract number NASW-3041.
I The authors wish to express their gratitude for the cooperation
of the various program offices in making data available for this study. .
l Many individuals,both in government organizations and in private indus-
i try, assisted in the development of the study data. Without their
assistance and cooperation, the large data base could not have been "_
l generated.
Members of the PRC study team were V. Anderson, C. Bloomquist,
l D. DeMars, W. Graham, P. Henmi, and G. Stiehl. In addition, the authors
i wish to acknowledge the efforts of J. Amos, H. Thomas, and J. Zell for
their assistance in report preparation.
lm
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U ABSTRACT \,
A
This reportdocumentsfourstudiesinvestigatingthe on-orbit
U reliabilityof spacecraft.The totaleffortincludedcompiling,inter-
preting,and analyzingoperationaland historicdata for 350 spacecraft
U from52 U.S. spaceprograms.
Failurerateestimatesare made for on-orbitoperationof space-
U craftsubsyst_is,components,and pieceparts,as wellas estimatesoF
U -,Ifailureprobabilityfor t_ sameel_ents duringlaunch. Confidencein-
tervalsfor both parametersare also given. I __!
U Basedon the totaldata sample(thisstudyand previousones),
the resultsindicatethat: (l) the successof spacecraftoperationis i '_| ,only slightlyaffectedby most reportedincidentsof anomalousbehavior,
I (2) the occurrenceof the majorityof anomalousincidentscouldhave
beenpreventedprior to launch,(3) no detrimentaleffectof spacecraft
I dor_ncy is evident,(4) cycledcomponentsin generalare not de_nstra-
J
bly lessreliablethan uncycledcomponents,and (5)applicationof
U productassuranceelementsis conduciveto spacecraftsuccessbut the
U effectcannotbe quantifiedon the basisof the dataconsideredin this
: report.
i 979004282-004
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I. INTRODUCTIONAND SUMMARY !i
U This report is a compilation, analysis, and interpretationof
orbital reliability data on U.S. spacecraft. It covers a period of
nearly 20 years and is a synthesis of four individual data collection
U and analysis efforts. The previous study reports were published in I
!.
1967, 1971 and 1972. ;i
A. STUDY OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE ir
The common objective of this study and the previous ones is to
achieve better utilization of reliability information inherent in space- I
craft operational data. All four studies have proceeded from the assump-
tion that empirical on-orbit information might be applied advantageously
to the planning and development of space systems.
The current study has several subsidiary objectives: (I) to
I compile all the relevant data into a single volume, (2) to update the
results of the earlier studies by considering NASA spacecraft launched
_] subsequent to those included in the earlier data base, (3) to prepare
i six experience bulletins to highlight particularly pertinent study find-
ings, (4) to extract information from the data base relative to the
_4
_! dormant or standby mode of spacecraft component operation, and (5) to
attempt to relate observed project success to product assurance elements.
! B. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Appendix A contairc the basic data on all anomalous incidents
_I that have been collected in this study and the previous studies.
1979004282-010
#; i •Illey are presented .'s ,ot,_ ,lata _et._. The fIrst set contaills d,lta If'ore
//5 spacecr,_ft launched prior to May 196t_. The second set e.,tends tilt, 'I
l I
tlme peYlod to ]q;l_ alia includes data from 79 more spacecraft. The tl .... ..I
1'_el e\[t, flds the ,l,lta ba_e allotheP yeal" afld adds six flew spacecraft, the I
fmn'tll set. derived in this study, e_tends the time period to 1977 and I!
,l,ld_ another .lO spacecraft, The total data base covers 350 spacecraft ]
,, IIf,,'oi_, ._. different space pro,_f'ah_s. Apl,endi\ I." provides details on this }
l|al,t l_allk covel'a_]e.
I/
lhe ana1_ses of the data in the body of the report is generally Li
,li_enIra" t_o saa11p1e.,,. The i'll'st iS called the pre-update sample and |_
inclu,h,._ all data tr_ the first three data sets. lhe second is usually
referred to a.,, "this sa,_ple" ,_" "this u;'date" and includes only the data
collected toy this stud._. Where tl_e _'esults are not obvious tile data ..
are co_,OineJ for ,111 salqples, 2,
It,
c. LWa.._.._S.!.3;<_'.L.h"tU3.U.O:'_£Ar_J_H_L}J!e!
il
Tile basic app,'oactl in a11 four studies has been to collect and ':I: _
\
,In,tl,_:e ,iS I_lilch reliabilit_ data tro_:_ as _fany spacecraft as possible
witllin cost and _chedule constraints, lhe first data set includes all iIi
kinds of si,acecr,lft. Tile secend and third sets were generally restricted
to loml-te_n spacecraft. This data set _ncludes only NASA spacecraft.
I
L
The basic data elements were col lect_M and recorded for individ- l]I
ual spacecraft. It is not the intent of these st,_dies to explicitly ctm_- . -
pal'e either space pro,]ra_,_s ,Jr spacecraft within a giv_,n program. For
_' this reason, and at tile request of _any p_'ogram otfices, pro_Iram and ,_
:[_I_ ,l,ac,,c,'aft ide,,tification ha,,e been withheld in most analyses. The _Ji
1979004282-011
PRC R-1863
3
basic data recordeu For each program is available at NASA Headquarters,
Code DP-4.
An important underlying bias of the study analyses is _ne common i e-
to all large-scalereliabilitydata studies. In the context of the sub- 1
ject matter of this report, the bias is that the spacecraft anomalies
analyzed are "reported" anomalies rather than the desired "occurred"
anomalies. The large and varied data base, however, _.nds to minimize
the effect of this _ias. _"
The information provided by the study analyses is extensive and
covers several areas relating to the reliability of spacecraft. For the
convenienceof readers of varied backgrounds and specialized interests,
this report has been organized so that analyses pertaining to particular
interestsappear in different sections. The summary be]ow indicates
these areas.
D. SUF_IARYOF RESULTS AND ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
Details of the data base, contributing data sources, and the tech-
niques of data analyses used are presented in Subsection II.A. For those
readers who are interestedonly in the basic events on which all analysis
was performed, the tabulation of specific events is presented in Appen-
dix A.
In this update, a total of 708 specific eventslrelated .o on-
orbit spacecraft reliabilitywere refined from the data provided by the I:
various program offices, cooperating agencies and individua]s. In the ,
pre-update samp]e there were 1,472 specific events tabulated. In the
t_
The term "events" is defined here to include anomalies, unsuccessful
launches,and spacecraft with no reported anomalies.
.j
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combinedsample there are 2,180 such events. The classification and _; ;+
analysis of these events for this update and for the pre-ue.d_te sample +
. fom the sut;ject matter of the renaining subsections of Section II. Sub- ,
sectionsII.Cto II.Eshouldbe of particularinterestto designengineers. H I,_
U
The classificationof anomai.)usincidentsreportedon the success-
t+i+
full, y launched spacecraft (88 percent of all spacecraft i_t the combined ,_ _._
sample) result in the following major conclusions:
I. Eighty-eight percent of the successfully launched space- t-._
craft reportedone or more incidents of anomalo,s behavior. I_] +":U2. In this update, 90 percent of the anomalies are reported +'
in the orbital or steady-state phase*of the spacecraft mission. In the |t "
L_
combinedsample, 77 percent are reported in the orbital phase. _
3. Ninety-four percent of the reported anomalies in this +
. upda_.ehave li*.tle or no effect on accompltsl_nentof the spacecraft mts- i_ t_+
l*
sion; in the combinedsample, gl percent.
, ,.., ,o,
anomalies. The telemetryo,_Idata handlings_bsystemaccountsfor 19.3
percentof thereportedanomaliesin th+s sample;23 p-.rcentin _,_ecom- .-_
_.
blnedsample. The payloadsubsystemaccountsfor 26.2and 25.8percent, j_
Thirty-sevenpercentof the anomalousIncldentsare dlstrlhutedessentially
equally between timing and control, power supply, attitude control and
stabllizatlonand the remainingninepercentare also distributedessen-
im
ttally equally amongthe propulsion, envtror_nt_I control, and structure U
subsy3tem. rl
*The orbital, or steady state, phase is defined here as the phase following [_
launch, injection end acquisition, n
U
-:' I
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I 5. Almost three-quarters of the anomalousincidents re-
ported both in this update and in the combined sample are electrical
m in nature as opposedto mechanical, chemical, unknown,etc. For those
i incidents where it couldbe determined whether the anomaly was caused
• by a piece-part,!2 percentof the incidentsin this sampleand 19 per-
" I cent in the combinedsample were determined to be catastrophic part
failures*; 20 percent tn both sampleswere noncatastrophtc part failures
am
i (degraded, intermittent, etc.); 68 percent and 61 percent, respectively,
-_I_ were nonpartrelated.
1
6. In thissample36 percentof the anomalieswere the re-
" I sult of assignable (i.e., "preventable") causes and 10 percent of the
incidents had no assignable cause. In the combined sample the correspond-
I ing percentageswere 35 percentand 13 percent. For the remainingincidents
B no cnnclustons could be drawn as to _he assignability or nonasstgnabtltty
of cause of failure. For those incidents of this update having assign-
! able causes, nearly 68 percent were attributed to various aspects of the
_ spacecraft design, 21 percent to manufacture, and 10 percent to spacecraft
m operation. The corresponding percentages for the combined sample are:
i I design,65 percent;manufacture,14 percent;operation,9 percent.
II
Failurerateestimatesfor spacecraftsubsystems,components,
I and piece parts are given in Section III. Included in that section are
estimates of the probability of failure during launch for the sameele-
am
1 ments and confidence intervals for both parameters. Reliability engt-
?
1 neers and analysts, as well as personnel responsible for programman-
i
agement and advancesystem planning, should find Section I!I of special
) i *Theeterm "catastrophic part failure" is defined as meaning catastrophic
.- to the part, e.g., a transistor or diode, and not necessarily to the
_! larger componentor system.
1979004282-014
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interest. The parameters presented for spacecraft subsystefnsand commonly li
used componentsare felt to be a significant contribution to the relatively
sparse tnfomatton generally avatl_,ble on this type of dale.
Estimates of the spacecraft element reliability parameters, fatlure
rate and probability or failure, in additton to their tabulation, result
tn the followt_ general conclusions:
1. The combtnedsample Indicates that the power end attitude
control and stabilization subsystemshave the highest on-orbtt fatlure I
rate amonqthe subsystems. The prepu|sion, environmental control, and
structure subsystemshave no reported catastrophic fatlures durtng orbtt I
2. The majority of the componentsconsidered tn both samples I _
exhibited no catastrophic fatlures etther during launch or In orbital
operation. The most fatlure-p_ne componentappears, as it dtd in the I
earlier studies, to be the magnetic tape untt wtth 55 catastrophic fatlures |occurring on 198 units observed. The fallure rate for mgnettc tape i(
units tn the combinedsample ts 24 fatlures per million hours, a stgntft- I i°
cant decrease over that reported In the earlter sample (35 failures per h
mtlllon hours), Most other componentshave somehwatlower failure ratss I
than those reported ear_ler.
3, In the combinedsample,thereare five ,alluresattributedto I m._i
piecepartsdurlnglaunchand 56 duringorbitaloperations. Forty-fourpart I |'!
types are tncluded tn the study. The on-orbit failure rates of capacitors
(1.0 per billton part hours)_ diodes (0.9? per btllton part hours), and tree- I
ststors (1.S blllton part hours) reflect the large numberof observed unlts
and operating ttme and the relatively few observed on-orbtt failures, m
I
.... I |i
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Theanalysesrelattve to the secondaryobjectives of this study
are presentedtn Sectton IV.
Theeffect of domancyon reliability is somewhatambiguous.
Theanalysts of thts factor doesdemonstrateconclusively, on the basis
of mptrtcal data, that magnettctape untts and transmitters havea much
htgher operating fatlure rate than domant failure rate. No failures or
_ anomalieswere identified whtchcould be attributed to domancy.
Asreported earller, the analysts of on/off cycltng gtves no clear
evtdenceof a supposedetrimental effect on reliability of cycltng space-
craft componentsas opposedto a steady state operation. Thedata do In-
dicate, however,that for cycled componentsa rapid cycling rate ts more
adverse than a slower one.
Noquantitative relationship betweenproduct assuranceelements
i andspacecraft mtsstonsuccesscould be demonstratedfrom the availabledata. Several particular potnts mertttng attention by spacecraft project
1 managersare contained in six experience bulletins.
1
_, Supportingtabulations for the enttre study wtll be fuundtn the
appendices;text references to the appropriate appendixsections are
m provided.
I
!
!
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II. CLASSIFICATIONANDANALYSISOF ANOMALOUSINCIDENTS
I The objectives of this section are to consider all reported tn-
I ctdents that affect the capability of a spacecraft to perform as desired,to classify these incidents in a meaningful and organized manner, to ana-
l lyze the incidents in areas of interest, and to draw conclusions generally
applicable to the U.S. space program.
i
A. BACKGROUNDANDGENERALAPPROACH
The purpose of this study is to continue the examination of on-
l orbit spacecraftreliabilityreportedin threeearlierstudies(see Ref-
erencesI, 7 and g). The earllerstudiescollecteddataon 42 spacepro-
I grams and 310 spacecraft. This study ts an "update" to the earlier re-
ports; therefore, data have been sought for both new programs and addi-
I ttonal spacecraft of the programs in References l, 7, and g. The major
I emphasisof the current report is on NASAspacecraft launched in a seven-
:. year time IntervalstartingIn 1970.
m The samedata collection and reduction procedures are employed
in each study. All of the reliability reports, Including the current
I one, use the same format. This uniformity allows for analyses and
I results of the four data sets to be combined in this report into a E
large body of tnfomatton about the reliability of spacecraft from i
1958 to June 1978. For this report, the data are generally presented
0,
in two groups or samples, one representing all data collected prior
-to this study and the other representing this sample or update only. In ,/
1979004282-017
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somecases (such as for fallure rates) results are given for the combined
sample as well. |
1. Data Sample
Exhibit1 depictsthe four on-orbitreliabilitystudies, I
_. including the current one in terms of the programsand numberof space- I
craft considered. As shown in Exhibit 1, the 1978 update includes 45
spacecraftfrom 20 programs. Flveof these45 spacecraftwere studied I
in earlierreportsand have continuedto operateInto the periodof in-
• terestto thisstudy. J
In all analysesof the combinedsample(fromall fourstudies) JC
the datahave beenadjustedto reflectthe non-lndependenceof the samples.
In otherwords,correspondingdataentriesin tablespresentedfor the I
ore-and post-jpdatesampfc_will not necessarilysum to the correspond-
ing dataele(_m}tfor the combinedsample. Thus, the data for the com- I
,. bined sampleare based on the operationalrecordsof 350 spacecraftfrom I
52 programs.
; 2. Sourcesof Stud_
Requestsfor specificdataelementsweremade to cog-
!
i nizant ,ponsorlngagenciesfor specificprograms. Manyof theseagen- I
ci_ had previouslybeencontactedfor data utilizedin the earlier
i studies. Contacts were madeto: I
_ NASA ProjectOffices(GoddardSpaceFlightCenter,Ames
I
_ _ ResearchCenter,LewisResearchCenter,LangleyResearch
...,. Center,WallopsFlightCenter,MarshallSpaceF11ght I
_'_ _ _'i
1979004282-018
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Center,Jet Propulsion Laboratory) I
NASA Headquarters
NOAA (NationalEnvironmentalSatelliteService) I
The open literaturealsoprovidedsignificantamountsof all I
typesof requireddata. The primarysourceof thesedatawas the
NationalTechnicalInformationService(NTIS,Springfield,Virginia) i
•,- microfichecopiesof governmentcontractreportsand symposium
proceedings.
i
3. Methodsof DataCompilation I
The types of documentationsoughtfor this studywere i
similarto the earlierstudies. The two major typesof data are: (I)
an engineeringreportof the finaldesignof the spacecraft,and (2) i
a flightanalysisfor individualspacecraftfromwhichoperating
historiesand all knownanomalousbehaviorscan be obtained. From this I
informationEngineeringAnalysisReports(EARs)are generatedfor each i
spacecraft.The EAR is talloredto providethe informationcontent
requiredto meet the studyobjectivesand providesa uniformbase for I
each spacecraftof the study. The EAR is completelydescribedin
Appendix B. I
In the EARsthe treatment of standby and redundant u,qtts is con-
sistent for all data samples and emphasizes the utilization of only known I
?
I
1979004282-020
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• values, Operationalhourstn the EARswererecordedas "powered"and
/
_l "unpowered"where such tnfomatton was known. For muchof the equtpmnt.
I however, the |nfomat_on available only Indicates that at a given ttme
I the equipment was knownto be operational. For thts reason the unlt of
measure tn the analyses of th_s sectton and of Sectton II! ts survival
ttma. In those Instances where standby hours are reported, tt ts known
that the untt tn questton was turned off for the gtven numberof hours
: and knownto have been subsequently operational. These data are analyzed
tn SecttonIV.
Redundant equipment was treated tn the following manner, %f a
spacecraft had an acttve redundancycomposedof, say, two unlts, and tf
the descriptive matertal Indicated that it was rensonable to assumeboth
untts operated successfully for, say, 1000 hours, then two entrtes are
made for the two untts. On the other hand, tf all that could be deter-
mined was that one or the other operated for the gtven tlme, then only
one entry was made.
i
_ 4. Methodsof _ta Analysts
a, Techniques' and Pa_meter_:ESt!mtt__
The authors belteve that the c_x of studtes
of thts nature ts the provision of a large mount of data tn a read_!y
usable fore. For thts reason, as well as the fact that the Infomatton
from the documntatlun does not warrant appl|catton of highly sophisti-
cated techniques, the methodsof analysts are stmp|e and straightforward.
Classification and sum_rlzatton, ustng simple, readable tables,
are the prtmry presentation techniques, [n general, statistical
_t
1979004282-021
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inferences are not drawn from these efforts. At the component/equipment I
level and piece-part level, failure rates have been generated using tech-
niques which are generally accepted. Conclusions have been drawn where
appropriate, but the emphasis is placed on presenting data in such a fen, I1that readers may eastly draw their own conclusions in areas of their
special interest. _ i
b. As_sum_33.a, nd Biases
Becauseof the emphasis on recording only known
values for the various data elements, engineering assumptions are held _ :_
to a minimumin the generationof an EAR, i i°
The major assumptionunderlyingthe estimationof failurerates
ls that time-to-failure is adequately expressed by the negative exponen- I
tlaldistribution.The datageneratedhereinpreclude the use of an
alternateassumption,a situationthat also existedIn earllerstudies.
The major bias In the studycontinuesto be thata11 anomalous
incidents in the analyses are "reported" incidents versus the desired
"occurring" incidents. The cause of the bias can be traced to several I
sources: (t) diversity of detatl. (2) method of documentation employed
by the various program offices. _3) reliance In somecases on personal !
interviews, and (4) state-of-the-art 1Imitations (t,e,, part operational I
data),
Documentation for the spacecraft in thts sample was significantly I
more detailed and of higher quality, on the average, than tn the earlier
studies. I
I
I
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5. Definitions
Definition of terms used in this report is presented in
context; terms requiring definition are generally associated with anomaly
classifications. The use of acronyms has been kept to a minimumand
those that are used are easily identifiable; mathematical symbols are
those in general use.
B. SUMMARYOF REPORTEDINCIDENTS
Fromthe spacecraftEARs,a summaryof all anomalousincidents
has been compiledfor eachof the four study samples. The summaryfor
thls studyis found In AppendixA-IVa and is in the sameformatas the
correspondinglistsfor the earlierstudies(seeAppendicesA-la,A-IIa,
and A-Illa). The formatlists in the followingorder: unsuccessful
launches;everyanomalousincidentrecordedin the EARs subsequentto a
successfullaunch;and finally,every sucessfullylaunchedspacecraftin
whichno anomalousincidentswere recorded.
Each line entry in the appendices referred to above tnclu.es first
an index relattng the entry to a specific program and spacecraft. 1 For
those launches that were unsuccessful, thts fact is entered to complete
the entire entry. In cases where no anomalousbehaviors were noted, thts
fact, plus the total time in orbit and whether the spacecraft is currently
operable or not, comp]etes the entry. Each anomalousincident recorded
contains the following information tn each entry:
1Thts relattons#|p between the index and spectftc launch ts not available
to the reader ilmdts a methodof preserving the anonymity of programsand
sp4cecr4ft.
\
................................................. _,_ m_.m_, .._,mm- _.._., .I_ . ........ _._ ....... .., _ _ _.,,_ ,., _qLml m
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1. Time the incident occurred. An entry of _ indicates
that the incident occurred between the end of countdownand the establish-
ment of the Initial orbit. An entry of " indicates that the anomaly _
cannot be pinpointed tn time since tt was intermittent, gradual, or un- Hknown. All other entries are tn hours.
2. Three short statements giving a description of the tnct- _ _
dent, its cause, and its effect on the mission as a whole.
3. Any knowncorrective action taken to prevent occurrence _
of the incident on future fltghts or to obviate its effect on the fltght _
under consideration. _ _-
4. Other clarifying remarks required to put the incident in
the proper context.
It should be mad._clear that this listtng does not pretend to be _ _
exhaustive of al1 such incidents that have occurred, even on the space- _ _.
craft reported in this study, because of the wide variability in quantity _.
and quality of data available to the study. Th:-re is no reason to be- I ,
lieve, however, that it is not indicative of spacecraft reliability '| C,
II*C. CLAS.SIF],CAT]Off,OF ANOMALOUSINCIDENTS I¢
I. sm_ ot'c,,,tt',¢,.tto,,co, , i:
Because of the large number of anomalousincidents in this ):
I:sample &and in the previous samples) classification and summarization is i_
mandatory to extract readtly usable information. A coding scheme, tden- *
1979004282-024
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I ttcel to that used In previous studies ts used to accomplish this pu_._e.
I There are ntne charactertst|cs for which each anotMlous incident ts coded.
.Sometnformtton neededto select a particular code for a given entry oc
I curs only tn the EARsso that, tn a sense, the classification carries Bore
information than provided tn the entries of AppendicesA-la, A-ZZa, A-Ilia,
I and A-Ira. The complete codlng of each entry ts given tn Appendices A-Ib,
I A-lib, A-lllb, and A-IVb.
Exhibit 2 lists the namesof etght of the classifications used.
I Definitions of the terms are gtven tn the following paragraphs, together
wtth the results of the classifications of the anemaltes. Romannumerals
I following the paragraph head|ngs refer to the Romannumerels tn Exhtbtt
I 2. The nJnth classification, SubsystemFunctJon, Js dJscussed tn Subsec-
I tton D.
2. .t sstonSubset(I)
I Thts code stwly identifies the unsuccessful launches (U)
I and those spacecraft for which there are no reported anomlies (S).
. For thts update, two of the 45 spacecraft launches were unsuccess
41J
I ful, there were no spacecraft that experienced zero anomalies. Ftve of
the 43 successfully launched spacecraft were considered tn the previous
I study as well as thts one. T refore, for the combinedsample: L_,
I . TotAl NumberohlsPacecraft: 3SO E
I Unsuccessful La_ches 43e
|
lJ!
I
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FXHIBIT 2 - ANOHALOUSINCIDENTCLASSIFICATIONCODES
I. Mtss._,_onSubset c. PowerSupply
o, Unsuccessful Launch d. Attitude Control and
Stabt I I zat|on
S, Spacecraft wtth No Q
AnomaliesReported d*. Propulsion
Spacecraft w|thAnomltes Reported e. Environmental Control
II. Htsston Term f. Structure I
g
L. Long Tem 9. Payload (Exper4mental
and Scientific)
_,. Short Ten.
h. Unknown D
_, III, Ntsston Phase
Vl A. nl
L. Launch and Acquts|tton B
E. Electrical
O. Orbttal (Steady-State)
M. _chantcal gQ. U.kno_n
IV. tqsston Effect O. Other
U. Unknown m
1. Negl.ig,ble g
Vl e. Inctdent
2 on Heg119161ebut Stall
C. Catastrophic Part
3. 1/3 to 2/3 Htsston Loss Fatlure Img4. 2/3 to I_rly Total O. Other Part-Related
Iqsston Loss lnc,.dent. I• S. E enttally Total N. Non Part Related
_ Iqsston Loss lnctdent
; U. Unknown U. Unknown
V. Spacecraft Subsystem Vl_ lnctdent Cause |
Ih Ttatngo Control and A. Assignable I
Goemnd
b. Telemtry and Data N. Non-Assignable I /_
._ I'hlndltno U. Unknown g
I,
D
-t
j_ _,_.._,.,_%_,, - , ,, ,H. ,,
; "_ T ' - , , ,,_,..,, ,,-, -_,. .... _ ]
J.
.r r.j. ..... !' '
Ii
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• Total Spacecraft Re_orttng No Anomalies: 40 '':
• Total Spacecraft Reporting Anomalies 267
e Total Anomalies Reported: 2,0%
The breakdown, by numberof spacecraft and percentage ts as follows:
Nun_er Percent
Pre- Data Pr¢ Data
U_date Base Update u__t_e Base
I. Htsston Subset
U. U,successful
L4unch 2 41 43 S.0 13.3 12.3
S. Spacecraft
Ano_ltes '_
Reported 0 40 40 0 12.g 11.4
Sl_cecraft
With
Anomltes
Reported 38 22g 267 gS.O 73.8 76.3
)
3. msstonTern (J!)
The code Identifies long-tern (L) or short-tyro (S) mis-
sions. If a mtsston ts anticipated to be. |onger than 60 day_ tt Is clas-
sified long-tern. A11 spacecraft except one in this data saml)le are long-
tern missions; the total sample c_nt_tns 138 short-term ar_ 212 lony-tem
m|ss|ons. |n the update _ta, there were 70S ano_lte_ associated wtth
long-tern missions, and one anomly wtth the short-tern mission. For the
total data base, 79.1 percent of *.he anam|tes are associated qtth long*
term missions, and ;)0.8 percent wtth short-tern missions.
1979004282-027
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follows: Thebreakdoym,by numberof anomaliesandpercentages,ts as E i
_ N_,ber.......... Percenta_qe. E
Total . Total I _i
Pre- Data Pre Data
Ud_.._e _ Base Ud._._e _ Base ,:
11.msston Term I
L. LongTern 705 990 1,695 99.9 71.9 80.9 i
S. ShortTern 1 "400 401 0,1 28.6 19.1 I
For thts sample, the averagenumberof anomaliesreported ts I
17.8 per long-term spacecraft. Thts ts significantly greater than the I i
pre-update ftgure of 7,1 anomaliesper long-tem spacecraft. Thts In-
crease appearsto be due tn part to the Increaseddetatl of reporting on- I
, orbtt experienceand tn part to the Increasedcomplexity of spacecraft I
_: t_; this sample, That ts, manyspacecraft carrted moreequipmentthan
• thoselaunchedearllerand thereforeweresubjecttomoreanomalles.For i "_
" the combtnedsample, the numberof anon_lousentrtes per long-termspace-
'- : craft ts g,7.
_ Further.analyslsconcernlngdetalledanomalytlmesw111be fo.na
,,. {n SubsectlonIf-D-; below,
:: ;..:_' : 4. NtsstonPhase(Ill)
l;_. : _ -/: : A spacecraft mtsstoncan be thoughtof as consisting of !
_ ;_ : _ two dtsttnct phases: launchandacquisition (L) and the orbttal or steady-
: . state phase(0). Ananomalyoccurring durtng launchandacquisition ts
_ clas_tf_,edL; tf tt occursdurtng steady-state operation ttts classified
) /
-<
L _
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I O, A thtrd category, Q, ts provided for those Instances where the dtchot-
I omycannot be madedue to Insufficient tnfomatton. The distinction was
madeon the best judgment available based on the engineering analysts ra-
m Indicating an ¢ , or veryports. Generally, those Incidents few hours
of elapsed ttme at occurrence, are classified as L, all others as O.
m The breakdownof anomalies occurring tn each category and the
m associated percentages ts as follows:
Number Percentage _
m Total TotalPre- Dat Pre- Dat
Update U_ Bas_ee _ _ Bas_ee
m ]II. Htsston Phase
L. Launchand
m Acquisition 5_ 415 480 9.2 29.8 22.9
O. Orblta!
I (Steady-State) _38 970 1,608 90.4 69.8 76.7
l Q, Unknown 3 _ 8 0.4 0.4 0.4
The 29.8 percent of all anomalousIncidents occurring tn the
launch phase prev!ous to thts update, reflects, at least tn part, the
fact that ,_11 Ranger, Hercury, and Gemtnt mtsstons were deftned to con-
stst of launch and acquisition phase only and that manyother Sl_Ce_raft
J (e,9,.Agena)were relatlvelyshort-tem, The 9,2 percentof a11 anomalles
|n thls updateoccurrlngduringtM launchphasecomparesreasonablywell
l "wtth the pre-update samplewhenconsidering the spacecraft complemnt of
I _. the pre-u_date sample.
1
': The five groups tncluded tn this classification tndtcate
r it!
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the samp!eas a result of a single re|lure (coded 5). _xtmum s_mple ttme
for the spacecraft ts far more 11kely to result from the cumulative effects
_; of several lower severity level anomalies, planned mtsston temtnatton, or
stmply, the extent of the ave|labia data.
6. Sp!lcecrafL Subsyst_:_(V)
: Each anomaloustnctdent |s coded according to whtch of
etght major spacecraft subsystem ts most closely related to the Incident.
z
_* An u, knowncategory ts tncluded for those cases where a relationship does
not extst or cannot be detemtnecl from the available tnfomatton. The
4
subsystemsused for thts classlf_.catton are meant to deftne br_d funct]on-
._ al operations found to one extent or another tn all spacecraft. The func-
_'1 t|onal definition for chosen rather than definition basedsubsystemWAS a
_ on hardware for two reasons. Ftrst_ subsystemdefinitions vary among
i organizations and amongprogramofft_es of the sameo_9an|zatton. The
L
data analysts requtres a grouptn9 that can be _pplled to a]l spacecraft of
_,- the collective data sampte, The secondand more Important reason for
using a functional definition ts that, tn the predestgn stages of future
_ programs, the programmanagementw|11 knowwhat functions the planned
sHcecraft ts expected to perform wtth more certainty than the actual
: hardware configuration that wtll be used to pe_fom the desired functions.
_. The COml_rtsonsat the subsystemlevel as def|ned tn thls report would be
useful tn the predestgn phase of program development. For example, one
if: _ould be Interested to know, based on past experience of other programs,
Bewl:_h_lt certainty e spacecraft would deploy tts structural elements
(structure subsystem)or supply power to the other planned functions
979004282-03
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(power supply subsystem). In the later stages of development of a pro I
jected program, whenmore ts knownabout the hardware configuration, the
tnterest would shift to the equipment group/componentlevel of analysis
which is hardware oriented.
The follc, wtng list defines the subsystemsand indicates the
types of equipment that are cons_ae,'edto be a part of each subsystem. I
a. _mtng, _ntrol and Command
Commandreceivers, decoders, timers, programmers, I
sequencers, commanddistribution equipment I
b. Telemetr_and Data Handling
Encoders,D/A converters,A/D converters,tape
recorders,signalconditioners,telemetrytrans-
mitters,trackingtransmitters,antennas I
c. Power
Batteries,solararrays,fuelcells,converters, l
Inverters,regulators,protectivedevices, I
chargeregulators
d. AttitudeControland Stabilization I
Gyros, sptn control, magnetometers, sun aspect Iindicators,eddy currentdampers,horizonscan-
ners,star trackers,dynamic control j _ti
d!
' Coding thts subsystemwtth a d* indicates that N --"
the propulsion subsystemconsidered here is
_
more closely related to the attitudecontrol I
subsystem of the spacecraft than to the launch I
m_ ,
1979004282-032
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vehicle. Included are hydraztne thrusters,
m tanks, val yes, etc. "E
m
e. EnvironmentalControl .,
T
m
Both passiveand activethermaldontrol
/
devices,life supportsysten,s.
f. Structure
Basicstructure,booms,solarpaddles,
separation.
g. _yload (Experlme,ltalnd Scientific)
Wide-bandcommunications(forspacecraftwhere
:. thisecluipmentwas considered experimental),
microwave equipment (cavities, TWTs,etc.,
flown for assessmentpurposes), university
exper(ments, particle detectors, massspec-
trometers, plasma analyzers, infrared radio-
meters,ultravioletradiometers.
AlthoughIt is feltthat thesegroupingsa_e essentiallyself-
: explanatory,checkinga few of the codes inAppendicesA-Ib,A-llb,
A-lllb,and A-IVb withtheircorrespondingentriesin AppendicesA-la,
A-lla,A-llla,and A-IVa shoulddispelany confusl_ :,,Isprocedure
_ is applicableto most of the other classificationsas well.
The breakdown,In termsof numberof anon_llesand their
associatedpercentages,to eachof the subsystemcategorlesis os
follows:ix
T
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Number Percentage _ '
Total Total I
Pre- Data Pre- DataUd_ Update B se Ud_ _ B se
V. S_pacecraft Subsystem _
/
a. Timing, Control
and Command 76 214 290 ]0.8 15.4 13.8
b. Telemetry and _ i_'+
Data Handling 136 463 599 19.3 33.3 28.6
c. PowerSupply 68 13l lgg 9.6 9.4 9.5 _ )+
d. Attitude Contro :_
_ and Stablllza- Btlon I04 183 287 14.7 13.2 13.7
dt Propulsion 31 31 62 4.4 2.2 2.9 _ _
e. Environmental +Control 7 29 36 l.O 2.1 1.7
f. Structure 28 19 47 4.0 1.4 2.2 _
g. Payload _ i I
(ExFurlmental m _+
and Scientific) 256 284 540 36.2 20.4 25.8
h. Unknown 0 36 36 O.O 2.6 1.7 _ _
The relativelylargepercentageof repoetedanomaliesin the _ i-
telemetry and data handling subsystemas indicated in the above breakdown, _ !_,is to be expected. Since this subsystem is, of course, monitored more
rl +closely than other subsystems, an indication of an anomaly is more likely _,
to be observed in thts area. The large numberof payload anomalies in _"
this sample relative to the number in the pre-update sample, is felt to @ i_
be due tn part to the large numberof payloads relattve to other sub- ,,
system functions tn the update. Also, payloads are often unique, push the B _
state-of-the-art, and are constructed with fewer quality assurance i
r
_p
I:
t_
i'
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provisions less stringently enforced than basic spacecraft subsystems. _,
- II Ftnally, the payloads carried by recent spacecraft tend to be more corn- _B
- plex than those carried by manyof the spacecraft in the pre-update
| "sample, and this may lead to more anomalous Incidents per payload, i_
Exhibits 4 and 5 provide additional information tending to confirm the _
I increase in payload anomalies.
¢
7. Incident Type (VI)
a. Incident Type (VI.A)
This classification places an anomaly in one of (L
I four mutually exclusive groups: electrical (E), mechanical (M), other '_
(0),and unknown(U). Thoseentriesin AppendicesA-Ib,A-llb,A-lllb,
and A-IVbcodedwith an E in the VI.A columnindicatethatanomalous _°
behavioris exhibitedby electricalor electronicparts,components,sub-
m systems,or functions. ThoseanomaliescodedM are similarlydefinedfor
m mechanical parts, components, subsystems, or functions. An 0 indicates
behavior of equipment that cannot be classified electrical or mechanical:
propellantdegradation,for example. A U indicatesinsufficientinform-
ation to assignthe entry to any of the other threecategories.
I The breakdownof anomaliesand percentagesin thisclassiflcation
l group is as follows: Number Percentage,
Total Total
m Pre- Data Pre- Data
_ Bas___e _ _ Bas_.___e
VI.A. IncidentType
m E. Electrical 473 1,065 1,538 67.0 76.6 73.4
M. Mechanical 66 126 192 9.3 9.1 9.2
m O. Other 60 98 158 8.5 7.0 7.5
U. Unknown 107 101 208 15.2 7.3 9.9
1979004282-035
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b. Incident_T_) I
'The classification of column VI.B in Appendices n
A-Ib, A-lib, A-IIIb, and A-IVb attempts to divide incidents into those U
thatare part relatedand thosethat are nonpartrelated. A codeof C H
u
indicatesthose incidentsarisingfrom a catastrophicpart failure*. An
0 indicatesthat the anomalousincidentts relatedto behaviorof a
part (or parts)thathas not failedcatastrophically{degraded,inter-
m
mittent,etc.). An N indicatesan anomalousincidentnot relatedto any
partmisbehavior.A U indicatesthat Insufflcl_ntinformationexists II
m
to determinewhetherpartbehaviorwas involvedor not.
The breakdownby numberand percentage of anomalies for these g
categories is as follows:
Number Percentage I
Total Total
Pre- Data Pre- Data
_ Bas.___e_e_ _ Base IB
VI,B, Incident Type
C. Catastrophic
Part Failure 42 183 225 5.g 13.2 10.7 il
mO. Other Part-
Related
Incident 68 174 242 9.6 12.5 11,5 iill
N. Non-Part-
Related !Incid nt 237 490 727 33.6 35.2 34.7
U. Unknown 359 543 902 50.8 39.1 43.0 I
m
* The tern "catastrophic" here is defined to mean "catastrophic" to the m
part and not necessartl,y to the larger componentor system. Typical
types of catastrophic part failures include a transistor or d¢)de m
shorting for no knownreason. This definition is consistent wtth that
used tn the negative exponential distribution for modelling failure ._,,.._ji, l_
probability, i
.c
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I Of the 347 incidents in this update where it could be determined
a whether the anomaly was port or non-part caused, 110 (31.7 percent) weY_
piece part related. Of these, 42 (12.1 percent) were catastrophic piece
B part failures. Of the i,lg4incidentsin the total database for which
thisdeterminationcouldbe n_de, 39.1 percentwere piecepart related,
B and 18.8percentwere catastrophicpiece part failures.
B It is importantto notethat, in the pre-updatesample,of the847 anomalousincidentswhere a reIatlonshipcouldbe coded,over three-
i quarters(78.4percent)are not catastrophicpart failures,and thusnot
representativeof the typeof failuresmodeledby the classicalreliabl-
l lltyapproach. In thisupdate,thistendencyis evenmore pronounced.
l Of the 347 anomalieswhere a relationshipcouldbe determined,87.9 per-
cent are not catastrphlcpartfailures.
l Furtheranalysisof parttypeswlll be found in SectionIII,
where survivalhoursand anomalousincidentsare usedas the basisfor
m reliabilitycalculations.Furtheranalysison the effectsof partfail-
ureswill be found in subsectionII-D-4below.
J 8. IncidentCause (VII)
l Three broadgroupsare definedfor incidentcause in
columnVII of the tablesin AppendicesA-Ib,A-lib,A-IIIb,and A-IVb:
I assignable causes (A), nonasstgnable causes (N), and unknown(U).
An assignable cause is attributed to an anomalous incident if
the tncdtent could have been prevented by taking someaction well
l withinthe state-of-the-artpriorto launch. If the incidentcould not
have been pt'evented in this manner, it is classified nonasstgnaule (N).
If InsufficIent information exists to makea Judgment, the anomaly is
I
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classified unknown(U). iThe breakdown for these categories ts as follows: "_
Number PercentaeL_ _o
Total Total li _gre- Data Pre- Data
Up_d_.e.U_Eda.t__eeeas_.e._UdU_e_ Up_d.ateBas__e_ I| _"
VII. IncidentCause lid
A. Asslgnable 255 477 732 36.1 34.3 34.9 |[ ",
ILl
N. Non-Assignable 71 193 264 10.1 13.9 12.6 ,,
U. Unknown 380 7?0 1,100 53.8 51.8 S?.S =ll_ Lt
this sampleand the pre-updatesample,the data indicatethatover one-
third (at least) of the incidents have assignable causes and thus form a g
clearbasiswhererellabllltyof spacecraftmightbe improved. Sinceover _ "
half of the anomalousincidents '_ere classified "unknown", the percent- _l. ,:_
ageofanomalieswith assIgnable causes ts probably muchhigher. Further U i _
discussion of the assignable cause category ts given tn Subsection II-D-3 _ _
below. U
g. SubsystemFunC.tlon99__(VIII) H
Thts classification ts a secondary breakdownof space-
craft subsystem, and ts treated in detail tn Subsection II-O-? below, g
10. Remrks' g
Whenthe 2,096 anomalous l.ctdents of the combined ::_
samp]e are categorized according to the characteristics discussed above, g
the results indicate that the typical reported anomaly occurs on a long- ll_
II
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I
I term mission tn the orbttal phase, has a negligible effect on the mission,
occurs In a payload, and is of unknownorigin and cause.I
D. FURTHEROBSERVATIONSHADEFROMANONALOUSINCIDENTCLASSIFICATIONS
Subsection C above has served to gtve a large picture of the
anomalousIncidents reported tn this study. It ts the Intent of this sub-
section to examine, tn more detatl, four of the characteristics used in
I the preceding subsection to classify anomalousincidents. The four
I characteristics of Interest tn this further analysts are: Iqtsston Phase,
Spacecraft Subsystem/SubsystemFunction, Incident Cause and Catastrophic
Part Failures/Mission Effect. The analysis of thts subsection, then, is
concernedwith the time of anomaly occurrence, Its location within the
I satellite, tts assignable cause, and the effect of part failures on
mission performance.
i 1. Htsston PhaseThe classification used above for thts characteristic
I somewhatarbitrarily considers the anomaly to have occurred either during
launch a_d acquisition or the steady-state, orbital phase of the mission.
I Since time ts of paramount Interest tn reliability studies, the analysts
of thts section focuses on the occurrence of the incidents as a function
I of tlme.
I The following analysis ts based on the 211 long-tern spacecraft
of the combinedsample,l For the 177 successfully launched, long-term
I
lone long-tern spacecraft ts not Included becausemtsston time ts not
available.
:1
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. spacecraft, there are 1,695 associated incidents of anomalousbehavior.
Exhibit 3 lists the sample hours associated wtth each spacecraft, along !1
wtth the numberof anomalies that occurred on each spacecraft. The
sample hours are the lengths of ttme for which data on anomlous behavior il
e4
are available to thts study. In somecases, "sample hours" represents the
complete loss of the mission; tn others tt stmply represents the extent
of the available data. The Index Numberts a code used to protect the
Identity, of the spacecraft. U
Note that use ts madetn Exhibit 3 of the symbol ¢ . Thts t!_
symbol tmpltes that loss of mission occurred very early, generally during
the launch and acquisition phase.
The rate of reported anomlous incidents as a function of time
can be derived from Exhibit 3. During c (essentially launch and acqut- [_
sttton) the reported anemaly rate ts 0.04 anomltes per spacecraft. _l
u
During the first 1,000 hours, the anemaly rate Is 0.10 anomltes per
The overall anomaly rate (subsequent to ¢ ) ts 0.37spacecraft.
anomltes per spacecraft per thousandhours. II
For short-ter,n systems, an analysts stmtlar to the preceding ts
not particularly instructive becauseof the short mission times, In
u
general less than 100 hours, and the concomitant short time to anomaly
occurrence. There are 12g successfully launched short-tern spacecraft I
tncluded tn the combinedsemple, and there are 401 associated anomalies.
II
Of the 401 anomalies only 127 have a recu-ded occurrence time other thar, E
B
|
|
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epsilon. These 127 incidentsare distributedin ti_.cas follows:
Timeof Occurrence Numberof
___._.._(Nour._.____ Anomaltes
O<t.(1 9
1 <t_<? 6
2<t__3 4
7 1
8 3
g 4
10 1 B
lO<ts20 7 I
20 < t _<30 14
30 < t <_40 3 1
40 < t _<50 7
50 < t _ 60 2 I
60 < t s 70 2 I
70<t_ 7
BO< t. 90= Z I
90 < t _ 1O0 8
I00 < t_ 200 2Z gJ
200 < t s 300 11 I
300 < t _ 400 3
t> 400 2 I !
l
z
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2. _ecraft SubsystemAnaly)!sby FunctlonalGroups
The assignmentof anomaliesto the subsystems(character-
isticV) is helpfulin narrowlngdo_i the functionalaspectof spacecraft
which is the most troublesome.A furtherstep in thlsdirectionis jus-
tlfledto isolatemorepreciselythe locationof anomalousincidents.
To do th_sa numberof subfunctlons(characteristicVIII)are definedfor
each p_evlouslydefinedspacecraftsubsystem. The subfunctlonsfor each
subsystemare definedso that theyare mutuallyexclusiveand exhaustive,
i.e.,theydo not overlapand theydo cover the entiresubsystem. Each
anomalousincidentcarries,therefore,two codes relatingthe incident
_I-- to functionallocationwithinthe spacecraft.The subsystems,subfunc-
tlons,and codes usedfor eachare tabulatedin Exhibits4 and b. Ex-
I hlbit4 gives the totalnumt_rof functionsIn the updatesample,the
iim totalnumberof anomaliesobserved,ana the anomaliesper funct(onfor
, thts update, Exhibit 5 presents the same information for the pre-update
i samples,
I 3, IncidentCause--Asslgnable
1 The interest in further examination of the anomalousin-
cidents classifiedas havingassignablecauses(characteristicVll) stems
il from theobservation thata majorway to increasethe reliabilityof
spacecraftis to ren_veall causesof anomalisticbehavior. Of the 706
m anomalousincidents t. this sample, 255 can be assigned a cause of occur-
il Pence, and of the 1,390 incidents in the pre-update sample, 477 can be
assigned a cause of occurrence. These incidents are examined in this sub-
;I sectionto discovertllecontributionthe# couldmake In pointingout
pPeblemareas.
-!
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EXllIDIT 4 - DETAILEDCLASSIFICATIONOF AkdtIALOUSINCIDENTSBY SPACECRAFT
SUBSYSTEMANDFUNCTION.THIS SAHPLE
Numberof
Numberof Reported !_1
Functions Anomalies Anomalies
SubsystemFunction _le _ per Function
a. TIHING, CONTROL, 43 88 2.05ANDCOHHAND
: 1. Receiving 43 28 0.65 _|
2. Decodtng 37 4 0.11
: 3. CommandDistribution 20 11 0,55
_ 4. Sequencingana 21 27 1,29
Programming
5. Ttmtng 24 11 0.46
6. Hanual Control ......
7, Unknown -- 6 -- W
8. Unasstgnable -- 1 --
b, TELEHETRYANDDATA 41 161 3.93
HANDLING
1. Data Potnt Senstng 10 29 Z.9O Ill
and Honttortng IJ
2. StgnaI Conditioning 6 3 0.50
3. Encoding, Fomatttng 38 10 0.26 M
4. Data Storage 34 55 1,62 m
5. Transmission 39 59 1.51
6. Unknown -- 1 --
7. Unasstgnable -- 4 -- N
m
c. POWE__R 45 68 1,51
1. Conversion 45 16 0.36 I
2. Storage 41 30 0.73
3, Power Control 43 13 0.30 m
4. Power Distribution 38 4 0.11 I_
5. Unknown -- 5 -- m
6, Unasstgnable ......
d, ATTITUDECONTROLAND 42 122 2.90
STA_tCIZATION
1, Orientation Sensing 40 58 1,45 i
2, Acttve Attttude 30 57 1.90
• Correction I
I
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I EXHIBIT4 - (Continued)
I Numberof
Numberof Reported
a Functions Anomalies AnomaIIesSubsystemFunction in Sample b_ Function per Function
g 3. PassiveStabilization 24 3 0.134 Unknown -- 4 --
5. Unassignable ......
i d *. PROPULSION 13 31 2.38
I. Navigation 9 3 0.33
I 2. Propulsion 13 27 2.083. Unknown -- l --
4. Unassignable ......
i e • ENVIRONMENTALCONTROL 38 7 0.18
I. ActiveThermalControl 22 7 0.32
i 2. LifeSupport ......3. Unknown ......
4. Unassignable ......| .f . STRUCTURE 45 28 0.62
I I. Basic Structure 45 ....2 DeployableS ructure 31 27 0.87
3. Separation 45 1 0.02
i 4. Unknown ......5. Unassignable ......
g . PAYLOADS 292 1.01
i I. Scientific 246 249 1.01
2. Technological 46 45 0.98
I 3. Unknown ......4 asstg able _
I_'f'
, UO,N ...... l!
| "
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EXHIBIT 5 - DETAILEDCLASSIFICATIONOF ANOMALOUSINCIDENTSBY SPACECRAFT L_
SUBSYSTEMANDFUNCTION,PRE-UPDATESAHPLE iga
Numberof !_
Numberof Reported B _F nctions Anomalies Anomalies
SubsystemFunction in Samp1e byFunctton per Function
a. TIMING, CONTROL_AND 222 202 0.91 HCOANO
1. Receiving 218 75 0.34 _]
2. Decoding 214 19 0.09 _
CommandDistribution 52 19 0.373.
4. Sequencingand 167 36 0.22 _] "_
Programming _5. Timing 157 19 0.12
6. ManualControl II ....
7. Unknown -- 23 -- H
8. Unassignable -- 11 _. u _
b. TELEMETRYHANDLINGANDDATA 236 440 1.86 B _1"_"!:__
1. MonitoringDataPoint Sensing and 154 177 1.15 B !l !_i2. Signal Conditioning 40 .... '
3. Encoding,Fomattlng 226 53 0.23 IR _
• 4. Data Storage 92 96 1.04 11 !_'
5. Transmission 231 92 0.40
6. Unknown -- 14 --
7. Unassignable -- 8 --
c . POWER 237 131 0.55
1. Conversion 130 24 0.18 U
2, Storage 230 47 0,20
3. Power Control 204 37 0.18 ill
4. Power Distribution 141 8 0.06 I1
5. Unknown -- 13 -- II
6. Unasstgnable -- 2 --
d . ATTITUDECONTROLAND 202 163 0.81
STABILIZATION |1. Orientation Sensing 186 73 0.392. Active Attitude 179 62 0.35
Correction |
, I
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EXHIBIT 5 - (Continued)
Numberof
Numberof Reported
l Functions Anomal tes Anomali esSubsystemFunction in Sample b_vFunction per Functton
"" 3. Pass,ve Stabi l t zatt on 4, 8 0.18
4. Unknown -- 12 --
5. Unasstgnable -- 8
:_j__ d*. PROPULSION 108 31 0.29
, . 8
/| 2. Propulsion 108 10 0.093. Unknown -- 3
!.._ 4. Unassignab,e -- IO
-I e. ENVIRONMENTALCONTROL 42 29 0.69
! g 1. Active Thermal 41 17 0.41Control2. Life Support 12 5 0.42
i- I 3. Unknown -- 2
4. Unasstgnable -- 5
f. STRUCTURE 227 lg 0.08
I I. Basic Structure 222 2 0.01
2. DeployableStructure 58 6 0.10
3. Separation 211 10 0.05
I 4. Unknown -- 15. Unasstgnable ....
I g, PAYLOADS 517 250 0.48
I. Scientific 465 174 0.37
l 2. Technological 52 75 1.443. Unknown -- 14. Unasstgnable ....
I h. UNKNOWN -- 36
| ;
9"
|.
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Assignablecausesare attributedto thoseanomaliesthat could
havebeen preventedby someactiontaken beforelaunch,withinthe state-
_,_ of-the-art,if thoseresponsiblefor the actionwere prescient. Anomalies U
due to postlauncherrorsin spacecraftcommandand controlare also cate- I_I
gorizedas due to dssignablecauses. Fourgeneralareascan be identified _
amongthe entriesfor whichassignablecausesexist. Theirdefinitions )
are as follows:
J
(I) Design: Thisarea coversmany anomalousbehaviors
suchas RFI and sensitivityproblems,unanticipatedwearoutor degradation BI
as a resultof timeor knownenvironmentalconditions.The anomaliescan _
, .be electrical,mechanical,thermal,or system-related. _.!_
(2) Manufacture:Thls area includespartsor materials _V_
thatare faultydue to somemanufacturingproblem,contamination,faulty
solderjointsor otherconnections,qualitycontrol,and the like.
(3) Operation: Humanerror is the primereasonfor
group. Errorsincludedinvolvethoseasso- Banomaliesclassifiedin this
ciatedwith the spacecraftcontrolfunction,usuallyby commanding,pro- 13
grammlng,or calibratingthe spacecraft.
(4) Other: A miscellaneous classification,grouping
togetherseveralareassuch as meteoroidbombardment,anticipatedwearout
and secondary failures. I
Exhibit 6 showsthe number of "assignable cause" entries in the
n
i four categories and the associated percentages for the successfully launched
spacecraft in thts sample. Exhibit 7 gives the same information for the 1_
El
pre-update sample. Of a11 assignable causes, 68.6 percent were attributed
1979004282-048
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- m EXHIBIT 6 - DETAILEDBREAKDOWNOFANOMALOUSINCIDENTSBYASSIGNABLECAUSE, || THIS SAMPLE
I Number Percent
i All Assignable Causes 255 100.0
N Design 175 68.6
RFI, etc. 38 14.9
I System 24 9.4
Electrical Components 54 21.2
I Mechanical 24 9.4
I ThemaI 27 10. 6Unanticipated Wearout or Degradation 6 2.3
n LaunchVibration and Shock 2 0,8
Manufacture 54 21.2
N Fabrication, Q.C., etc. 19 7.5
i Contamination ]5 5.9
FaultyPartsor Materials 20 7.8
D Operation 26 I0.2
Other 0 0.0
I
!
!
!
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_., _,H,,,",-OE,',..EOB,,= ,,0,_,O,',,LOOS,C, E,,,,,,S_,O,,,L_=_.
Number Percent _
] "_"
All Assignable Causes 477 100.0 ;:
Destgn 289 60.6 'El
RFZ, etc. 82 17.2
._ System 49 10.3 ii]
Electrical Components 58 12.1 _- _,
HechanJcal 28 5.9 _ _"
W 3
Therma1 32 6.7
rm
Unanticipated gearout or Degradation 27 5.7
LaunchVibration end Shock 13 2.7
Hanufacture 70 14.7
Fabrication, Q.C., etc. 34 7.1
Contamination 21 4.4
Faulty Parts or Haterials 15 3.2 E'
Operation 41 8.6
Other 77 16. I
I
|
|
'll
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to Design tn thts update, 60.6 percent tn the pre-update sample. In
I thissample 21.2 percent were attributedto Manufacture comparedto
14.7percentIn the pre.updatesample. Of assignablecausesI0.2per-
I centwere attributableto OperationIn thlsupdate,8.6 percentin the
I pre-update sample. There were no assignable causes tn this update that
were classified in the miscellaneous "Other" category; 16.1 percent of
I the pre-update assignable causes were in this category.
As the exhibitsindicate,t_o of the fourcategoriesare further
I si-n"subdivided. The various subcategortes under "De y are as follows:
(1) the subcategory "RFI, etc." includes all anomalousincidents attri-
m buted to inadequate RFI design, noise sensitivity, and transtents--14.g
m percent of the assignable causes in this update belong to this category,
and I;'.2percentof the pre-updateassignablecauses;(2) the three sub-
i , includeincidentsarlslnnca[egort es "System," "MechantcaI " "Thermal," ,,
mspectlvely,from inadequate design (a) in the spacecraft/environment or
I subsysteminterfaces,(b) in deployment,structuralstiffness, or art),
I movingmechanicalparts, and (c) for proper spacecraftthermalbalance;
(3) the category"ElectricalComponent"refersto anomaliesattributedto
I inadequate design of a receiver, encoder, horizon sensor, or any elec-
trical or electroniccomponent--thereare 21.2 percent update and 12.1! ,percent pre-update assignable causes in thts category; (4) "Unanticipated
I gearoutor Degradation"is attributedto anomalieswhere,for example,a
batterysimplywearsout beforeanticipatedor mere other componentsor
I partsdo not have the inherentcapabilityto
survive either the normal
spacecraft environment or the expected life of the componentor part;
!
!
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U(5) those anomalies classified "Launch Vibration and Shock" are attributed
to designs tnauequate to survtve the nomal stresses a spacecraft under- I]
goes durtng launch. There are only 0.8 percent update and 2.7 percent pre-
update assignable causes tn this category.
Under "Manufacture" there are three subcategortes. Included under
"Fabrication, Q.C., ETC." are anomalies ltke cold or loose solder Jotnts, I
loose conencttons and missing parts. "Contamination" covers the relatively B
high occurrence of clogged lines, excess moisture, foreign matter in valves
and the ltke--5.9 percent update and 4.4 percent pre-update assignable
causes fall in this category. "Faulty Parts or Hatertals" indicates such
items as a faulty capacitor or degradedpropellants caused by an improper
manufacturing process. All of these subcategortes are mutually exclusive. B
4. Catastrophic Part Fatlures/Htss!:n Effect.
As indicated earlier, there are 42 catastrophic piece part
failures in the update data. These 42 anomalies are further analyzed here
to provide insights into their effects on mission performance. B
To achieve the proper perspective, two detailed data breakdowns B
,i
are required, 1) the extent of mission ioss caused by part failures, and
2) the proportions of part/non part related anomalies caustng crtttcal
mtsston loss. In other words, the situation is examined from two dtrec-
' ttons, namely, both the extent and the role of part failures on mission I
loss.
The following breakdown indicates the extent, by numberof !
anomalies and percentage, of mission loss caused by the 42 catastrophic I
piece part failures:
!
B
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Htsston Effect Number Percent
I 1. Negligible 19 45.2
I 2. Non-Negligible butSmall 17 40.5
3. 1/3 to 2/3 Mtssion
I Loss 1 2.4
4. 2/3 to Nearly Total
I Mlsston Loss 0 0
5. Essentially Total
Htsston Loss 2 4.8
I U. Unknown 3 7.1
I From the above breakdown, it can be seen that at least 85 percent
of catastrophic p|ece part fatlures do not significantly impact the
I mtsston. Someof thts may be due to the provision rJf redundancy.
H The secondbreakdown, provtded below, Indicates the role of part/
non-part related anomalies tn significant mtsston losses. The breakdown
I ts tabulated for 1/3 or greater mtsston losses (mtsslon effect categories
B 3, 4 and 5). In the update data, a total of 17 anomlies caused such
losses, and the numberand percentage of thetr distribution ts as follows:
I Inctdent' Type Numbe__._.._r Percent
C. Catastrophic Part 3 17.6
I Fat1
ure
O. Other Part-Related
I Fat lure 4 23.5
N. Non-Part Related
I Fatlure 4 23.5
U. Unknown 6 35.3 B
II!
,
b
1979004282-053
PRCR-1863 ;_-
46 _"
, This breakdownIndicates that of the mtss|ons Incurring substan- _
tial loss, catastrophic part failures were responsible 17.6 percent ofthe tlme.
It ts to be emphasizedthat the results of these two breakdowns U
are not contradictory, but rather when taken together provide a posstbly
useful tnstght into the relat|onshtp of part fa|lures and mtsston loss.
That ts, whtle catastrophic part failures, per se, usually cause only
minor loss, when a major loss does occur there ts a stgntf cant probab|-
11ty that tt wtll be due to a catastrophic part failure.
5. Remarks.
Note that besJdes the categorJzattons prcse:;ted here and U
in previous sections, the reader can perfom any of a large numberof
otherclasstftcattonsby ustng therawdata presentedtnAppendtxAof i _il_
this report Also, more specific or detatled tnfomatton ts available by i,
"querying" the data bank to obtain JnfomatJon from the EAR's on spec|ftc i." _
topics of interest. [._"
r.. CONCLUSIONS U !,!| F_,
The emphestsof thts sectton, as well as the whole report, ts to _| [:
present the total fund of data regarding incidents of anomalousbehavior _,_J_
reported on spacecraft. A few interesting observations from the point of
view of the authors are ltsted below.
1. The vast maJortty of reported Incidents have 11ttle or
no effect on the accomplishmentof the spacecraft mtsston _
(see subsection lI.C.5). In thts update, 94.3 percent
of the ano_ltes had Sinllll or negligible effect on mtsston
......... _ h - 4 I _
1979004282-054
..... ...... !
i'
I PRCR-1863 .
i 47 j
goals, and 89.5 percent of the anomalies tn the pre-update
I samplehad smallor negllglblee:fect.
2. Of the 347 incidentsin this updatefor which it could be i
determinedwhetherthe anomalywas partor non-part i
I caused,II0 (31.7percent)were piecepart-related,and
42 (12.1percent)were catastrohpicpiecepart failures.
| ,iOf the 1,I84 incidentsin the combineds_mplefor which i
this determination could be made, 39.1 percent were piece [
I _
!
part-related,and 18.8percentwere catastrophicpiecepart i
failures.
I I. Eighty-sevenpercentof the pre-updatecatastroph,cpart i
fallureshave smallor negligiblemissioneffectcompared ;l
1 to 86 percentof the catastrophicpart fallure3in th_s
! .update. _ever, 12 percent of the major mission losses
on tht_ update were due to catastrophic part failures.
i 4. Of the _66 incidents in the combinedsamplewhere suffi- )
I ctent information exists to distinguish between assignable
and nonass!gnable incident causes, over 73 percent fall
° I into the assignable category. These incidents generally
could have been prevented prior to launch by someaction,
I well within the state-of-the-art (see Subsection II.C.8).
I The 73 figure ts tn close wtth all I'
percent _greeeent
earlier data samples.
I 5. The tabulation below indicates the ftve spacecraft
functions wtth the highest anomly rate_ tn thts update
I
I
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U
_, and the pre-updatesample. _::
__] This Update Pre-Update '-;
Datapointsensingand . Technologicalexperiments _
_ monitoring _,,_
Propulsion DataPointsensingarid "_
monitoring B '_;'_
Activeattitudecorrection . Datastorage _;.
Datastorage . Life support _.
Transmission . Active thermalcontrol !!
6. The five spacecraftfunctionswith the lowestanomaly _ i_
ratesin thisupdateare: Basic structure,separation,
powerdistribution,decoding,and passivestabilization
(seeExhibit4). This llstis the same for the pre- B 2_.
updateexceptthatpassivestabilizationhas replaced _] _E_
propulsion.It is surprisingto note thatpropulsion, :_ ):_
whlch had one of the lowest rates of anomalies per B li_,
H !ifunctionin the pre-updatesample,has one of the
highestratesof anomaliesper functionin the update I_]
ICit
7. The most commoncaus_of spacecraftanomalies(when
; assignable)is design(seeExhibits6 and 7). This
_._ agreeSstudies.Withthe conclus|onreachedin all previous '_ __ii
] 979004282-056
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I Ill. SPACECRAFTHARDWAREELEMENTRELIABILITIES
I
This sectiondiscussesnumericalreliabilityfactorsfor three levels
m of hardwareelements;spacecraftsubsystems,components,and piece-parts.
I Two reliabilityfactorsof prime interestmay be readilyderivedfrom avail-
abledata. The firstis the probabilityof hardwareelementfailureduring
I launch(q) and the secondis the on-orbithardwareelementfailurerate (_).
The derivationof thesefactorsis firstdescribed,thenthe resultsare pre-
I sented.
I A. DERIVATIONOF PARAMETERESTIMATES
m if it is assumedthateach identicallynamed hardwareelementhas
an equalprobabilityof failureduringlaunch,irrespectiveof mission,
m thenq may be readilyestimatedas
I,
I q = - (I)N
I where _ = numberof harawaree1_ :ntfailuresduringlaunch
N = numberof hardwaree1(mentsin the sample.
I It has been shownrepeatedlythat,under veryminimalconstraints,
to/1I _(t) = exp - k dt (2)
I
I where _ = hardwareelementfailurerate
I
1979004282-057
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In this formulation x may be any integrable function of Lime. The pre- I
ponderanceof reltabt Itty literature and practtce assumes, however, that
is constant, at least for most electronic hardware elments found in I
spacecraft. In this case Equation (2) assumesthe more familiar fom I
R(t) = exp(-at) (3) 1
In situations where Equation (3) applies, it is also well knownthat
the best estimate of _ for a particular hardware elment type is given I
by ),= n"f (4) l
_--' m
where n - numberof equivalenthardwareelments underobservation
t t" survival ttme of the lth such elment I
and !
f = total numberof failures observed.
I
lhe _ormulatlon for determining confidence intervals for q and
are again well knownand are given below for 90-percent intervals: I
i' ql _; q _ qz I
! (s)
where q ts such that I
I
I
N
(, * oo, Ii=s.
I
, ''_q
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i t • 0
xI .,'_ _x, (6)!
where
_ 0,',_5 (2f)
' N" t
I i=l
I and
I x;.o_' (:t"+ _)_'_ n.......
\,
| - ,
I If t or f a_e zero, the above fomul_tions give one-sided 95-peecent
confidence ltmtts of the form
I 0 < q < q
(7_
!
Thus, the prtma_y burden of thts section ts to derive esttmtes and
I confidence Intervals for the two pa_'amete_sq and _, rhts 4s
I accomplished by flrst discussing the input data, its derivation and
1979004282-059
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limitations, Then each of the three tiers of hardware level ts treated I1_ -
..+_ separately by deriving the pertinent estimates and evaluatttlg the results, ++
J:!
B, INPUTDATA ' _+_
The basic comptlat_on of data for each spacecraft in this study was _
performed precisely as for the previous three studies of on-orbit reliabil- _ !_+
H( )ity data from spacecraft, lhe procedure results in the generation of a
working documentcalled an Engineering Analysis Report (EAR). The details
of the compilation process will not be repeated hepe. 1 A briuf synopsis of
the procedure, however, wtll clarify the origin of the basic data used in -_'
this _ectton to derive estimates for the various parameters. H
Essentially, a key step in the compiling an EARts to determine and
list componentsfor _ particular spacecraft that are of a sufficiently high I
level so that their operating history may be readily determined and yet are
of a sufficiently low level so that it is reasonable to assume that their
normal operation would be precluded by the occurrence of a piece-part failure.
The spacecraft subsystems to which these componentsare assigned are also
listed as are the piece parts within each identified component, Fromthis
data,+ subsystem, comlx)nent, and piece part operating histories are determined
and pertinent ttme factors are computed, I
I
Componentand piece-part failures ape determined directly front the II
EARs, These failures are also a subset of entries contained tn AppencltxA(
and can also be determined directly therefrom. Subsystem failures are de- I
lib
termtned dtrectly from the the entries of Appendix A, that ts, those anomalies _+
IFor detailed description of the EAR, the reader ts referred to AppendixB,
I r+
,?
, + ""+ ,,,,, ?
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m -codedas being relevant to a particular subsystemand causing severe de- ,.,:_<
I gradation to the mission (Mtsss!on Effect severity levels 4 or 5) are con- ,_
sidered as being subsystemfailures.
i In the determination of piece-part failures for estimating _ (Equa-
tion (3)),a failureis attributedto a piecepart if, and only if, it is t_
knownto have failed in a catastrophic manner for no evident cause. This ,._
, • definitionis consistentwith the definitionof k as it is utilizedin Equa- __.
l
tion (2), All such piece-part failures are coded with a C in Columnvim _)
I and an _ in ColumnVII of the classification codes of Appendix A. In this :_;
_m_
update 19 such coded anomalies have been added to the data base.
IN
m Failuresare attributedto a componentin the samemanner,essentially
by treatingthe entirecomponentas if it were a big piecepart....
Parameterestimatesare calculatedfor threedata sets: (1) the pre-
I updatesample.(2) the ('_taobtainedin this sample,and (3) the combined
: sample. Exhibits8, 9, and lO tabulatethe subsystems,components,and
I partsconsideredin tMs sectionof the studytogetherwith their totalpop-
ulation,the numberfailingduringlaunch,theircumulativesurvivalhours
I and the numberfailingduringorbitaloperation.
" H Two pointsshould be notedwith respectto the survivalhours shown
•_ in theseexhibits. First,theseare the cumulativesurvivalhourscontalne.
Y
I in the databank for eachof tl_evarioushardwareelements,and are not to
be confusedwith failurerates. Second,the survivalhoursvary amongele-
ments fromquite high to relatlvelylow. Thlsoccursfor severalreasons.
In somecases it ts due to the populations of the elements under considera-
tion beingquitelargeor relativelysr_ll. In othercases,the elements
_i-- that were used to a greater extent on short term missions did not accumu-
1979004282-061
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lateas _ny survivalhoursas elementsusedextensivelyon longtermmissions.
_" Also,elements experiencinga largenumberof failures_uld obviouslyaccu- _
;:4 mulatefewersurvivalhours thanelementswith a historyof continued,satis-
factoryoperation, il ..
Exhibit8 presentsthe basicdata tabulationof the pre-updatesample. _ _.
Exhibit9 presentsa similartabulationfor the sampleof this study. Ex- _
hibitI0 containsthe tabulationfor the combinedsample.
The spacecraftsamplesof the previousreliabilityreportsand this
reportare not independent.Fivespacecraftin thissamplealsoappeared B _ "
in the earlierstudies. Thesespacecraftwere launchedprior to 197_ _
and havecontinuedto operateintothe time periodof thisstudy. It )/
is for this reasonthat the data for thesefive spacedrafthave been up-
_r
datedand includedin this study. Thus, correspondingentriesin Exhibits _'
8 and 9 do not necessarllyadd to give the correspondingent_ in Exhibit _
I0. Thoughthe samplesare not entirelyindependent,the methodof present-
ing the dataallowsexaminationof the basicdata elements_ three
timeperiods:spacecraftlaunchedin the interval1958to 1970 (12years), _:
Bthoselaunchedin the interval1970to mid-1977(7½years)and the total
sample,coveringnearly20 years. @ '_
The main rule in constructingExhibits8, g, and I0 was to enteronly :a
knownvalues. For example,as ExhibitI0 indicatesthereare 354 re- ,_
ceivers in the co_',ined sample %r which operational histories are c_- |plete;cumulativelythesecomponet_tssurvivedat least5.8 millionhours
and exhibitedat leasttwo launchfalluresand flveorbitalfailures. I _-,
It is knownthatthe figuresare higherthanthose presented,but It Is
_ not knownby how much. Thls resultsfromIncompletenessof thehlstorical j
]979004282-074
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data for so_ of the spacecraftin the data sampleI and does leadto dlf-
Q" ficultyin interpretingthe resultantestimatesof q and _ . Further
discussionof the interpretationdifficultyIs discussedin latersubsec-
tionswhereeach hardwaretier is treatedin detail.
• _ Exhibits8, g, and 10, then,presentthe basicdataand form the
basisof the analysesperformedin the subsequentsubsections.Interpre-
: _ tationand conclusionsare, of course,influencedby the total knowledge
acquiredin the courseof the study.|
K
I C. SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS
For this study,the eightspacecraftsubsystemsare defined
:E exactlyas theywere in all earlierstudies. In pointof fact,each pro-
gramand oftendifferentvehiclesin the same programuse a differentin-
_ ternalsubsystemdescription.The expedientof relatingsubfunctions
I of eachspacecraftto a set of previouslydefinedsubsystemsin a mu-
tuallyexclusiveand exhaustivemannernot only providesfor ease in
datacompilationacrossvariously-namedsubsystemsbut also accomplishes
two other importantgoals. First,it a11owsthe anemalousincidentsto
I be assignedto one and only one functionallocationwithinthe spacecraft.
•I Second,It avoidslistingrecognlzablesubsystems,i.e., thosetraceable
to a specificprogram. It is quite clearthatthis procedureintroduces
*I a substantlaldegreeof heterogeneityIntothe eight subsystemcategories
thus defined. Nevertheless, for large system planning considerations,
!
i lAs previously noted, the completenessof historical data for the sample
I of thisstudywas superiorto thatof earllerstudies.
,|
...._ __'_
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someindication of gross, average launch fatlure probabilities (q) and 1
on-orbit failure rates for spacecraft subsystems (x) might be useful. I /
Exhibit 11 presents the best estinates and confidence limits for
q and x for the earlier StudieS. Exhibit 12 presents the same infor- 1
mation for the spacecraft of this study; Exhibit 13, for the combined
data sample. It
It should be borne in mind whenusing or studying the three ex- 1hibits for estimates of the subsystemparameters that a subsystemfailure
is defined as someanomalousincident associated with the subsystem, the I
result of which is to reduce mission effectiveness by at least 2/3 of its
potential effectiveness. The parameters as given are felt to be reason- I
ably indicativeof failurepropensitiesof spacecraftsubsystems.
' D. COMPONENTANALYSIS |
", The compon_.ntslistedin Exhibits8, 9, and 10 displaya wide
variationin both numberof itemsin each sampleand in numberof sur-
vival hours. This situationreflectsboth variationin absolutecomponent
populationas discussedearlier,and in the inputdata. Someof the
entriesmay appearto be insignificant.The intentin providingthe
tJ
entriesis to add to other datathatmay be availableto the reader
ratherthan to providemeanlngfulestimatesof rellabllityparameters. J
As indicatedpreviously,only knownvaluesare Included.
ml
The best estimates and the 90-percent confidence intervals for q J
-i
(theprobabil!W of fallureduringlaunch)for componentshavingone or m
m
more failuresduringthe launchphase are given in Exhibits14 and 15.
Since none of the componentsin this update experienced a launch failure
|
, T ,_C........ .. .., !
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EXHIBITII - SPACECRAFTSUBSYSTEMRELIABILITYPARAMETERESTIMATESAND _;:i....
90-PERCENT CONFIDENCE INTERVALS BASED ON PRE-UPDATE SAMPLE Li_ _
,_, i¢_
Probability of Failure On-Orblt Failure Rate i!;A_'
During Launch (FailureslMi111onHours) [_ ',
............ _.
g Timing,Control,and ;Command 0.0060 0.018 0.040 0.75 2.2 5.0 ,
m o.,.Handling 0 - O.0094 O.19 I.I 3.3 II_il _'_,
Power O.0056 O.Ol6 O.038 4.2 7.0 lI tl_:'l,
I _.__., ,,_ _!_1,AttitudeControlandStabilization 0.0067 0.020 0.045 [4_| _
I Propulsion 0.0074o.o_ o.o_o _';_[_1_:1!_:;_
I Environmental Control 0 - 0.074 0 - 4.6 _-'i_:l" "_'_
Structure O.0058 O.016 O.037 0 - I.I _._._,,t,._
Payload 0.0042 0.012 0.028 0.028 0.54 2.6 ,_
Note: Upperand lower90%co_fidenceboundsare indicatedas ql and :[,_,_,:_
for the probability of failure during launch, and by _I and _,_;_ __ on-orbitfailurerates.
• .......,.. _ _ .._..___.._,. ,_-,
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EXHIBIT12 - SPACECRAFTSUBSYSTEMRELIABILITYPARAMETERESTIMATESAND J i_
90-PERCENTCONFIDENCEINTERVALSFORTHIS SAMPLE _ _
i
I_iF_
Probabilityof Failure On-OrbitFailureRate
: DuringLaunch (Failures/MillionHours)
SpacecraftSubsystems q_].l _ q_.22 ___l __ _k2 _I
Timing,Controland Command 0 - 0.062 0 - 2.4 BI_
Telemetryand DataHandling 0 - 0.052 0.059 l.l 5.4
Power 0 - 0.071 0.46 8.9 42.0
AttitudeControlandStabilization 0 - 0.047 0 - 2.2
Propulsion 0 - 0.14 0 - 8.2
EnvironmentalControl 0 - 0.13 0 - 7.0
Structure 0 - O.086 0 - 3.7
Payload 0 - 0.043 O.025 O.49 2.3
|
!
!
!
|
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I EXHIBIT 13 - SPACECRAFTSUBSYSTEMRELIABILITYPARAMETERESTIMATESAND _90-PERCENTCONFIDENCEINTERVALSFOR COMBINEDSAMPLE t_
I
i
Probability of Fatlure In-Orbit Failure Rate
g DuringLaunch _FaiIures/MiIIlonHours)Spacecraft
Subsystems q_].l q q2 xl x x2
g Timing,Control 0,005 0.015 0.034 0.47 1.4 3.1
and Command
g Telemetryand Data
Handling 0 - 0.010 0.3l l.l 2.g
g
Power 0.0048 0.014 O.033 4,5 7.4 12.0
g AttitudeControl 0.0051 0.015 0.035 1.8 3.5 6.0
and Stabilization
g
Propulsion 0.0061 0.023 0.058 0 - 8.2
g
Environmental 0 - O.057 0 - 3.0
g Control
Structure 0,0049 0.014 0,033 0 - 1,1|
Payload 0.0037 0.01] 0.025 0.11 0.61 I.g
l
l
I
I
I
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EXHIBIT 14 - PROBABILITYOF FAILUREDURINGLAUNCHAND90-PERCENT
CONFIDENCEINTERVALSFOR SELECTEDSPACECRAFTCOMPONENTS '_':'_
BASEDON PRE-UPDATESAMPLE
Probabilityof FailureDuringLaunch :!F
Component ql (_ q2 _:_ !?;..
DC/DCConverters 0.00027 0.0052 0.024 _ •
Heaters O.O001E 0.0029 0.01.A, _ _iI
f
Horizon Sensors O.00043 O.0083 0.039 B
J
Programmers 0.00089 0.017 0.082 _ _,iill
Receivers 0.0013 0.0071 0.022
Sequencers O.0029 O.Ol6 O.051 ,K--
Sun Sensors O.00053 O.010 O.049 _';
Timersand Clocks 0.00024 0.0046 0.022 ,,__,;
VoltageControlled 0.00077 0.015 0.071 _:i|_
Osci11ators B
_i _,_- ;--; _
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EXHIBIT IS - PROBABILITYOF F_It.UREDURINGLAUNCHAND90-PERCENTCONFIDENCE
INTERVALSFOR SELECTEDSPACECRAFTCOMPONENTSFOR THE COMBINEDSAMFLE
' '!iProbabilityof FailureDuringLaunch
B Component ql q q2
DC/DCConverters 0.00018 0.0034 0.016
I Heaters 0.00013 0.0026 0.012 F!
, HorizonSensors 0.00032 0.0062 0.029 _I
m Programmers 0.00066 0.013 0.060 !I
I Receivers 0.00010 0.0056 0.018
Sequencers 0.0027 0.015 0.048
Sun Sensors 0.00033 0.0064 0.030
Timersand Clocks 0.00020 0.0039 0.018
m
Voo_g_1latorsC°ntr°lled 0.00070 0.014 0.064
!
!
I
m
I
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(see Exhibit 9), no estimates of q are provided. 1:1
Exhibits 16, 17, and 18 present tile estimates of x for the _ _
selected components of the three data samples. H
u
Generally, there are not enough known failures to reach a reason-
able degree of statistical stability. Note that tn tile combined sample
only one component has three launch failures, two have two launch fail- M
ures, and the rest have either zero or one. The width of the confidence
intervals shown in Exhibit lS are indicative of the meager failure data. IIU
The on-orbit failure rates, as shown in Exhibit 18, are slightly more
stable. Ten components in the combined sample have five or more fail- U)
ures.
E. PIECE-PART ANALYSIS ||)
As with the component analysts, stress was placed on using only
data for piece par;s that are known or can be reasonably assumed. Many
more assumptions are required at the piece-part level with regard to op-
f_
_m erating hours since telemetry data slmply ts insufficient to describe the
operational history of many spectfac piece parts in a given spacecraft.
m
It will be recalled that an operating assumption of this study is that as
long as a component is c_pletely operable, so is every piece part within I
the component. When a component exhibits anomalous behavior, the piece
I!
in Exhibits 8, 9, and I0, represent minimum part-hours within the llmits k
,,_t,
of the tnput data.
" -::: ....-
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_XHIBIT16 - ON-ORBITFAILURERATE ESTIMATESAND 90-PERCENTCONFIDENCE :*!
I INTERVALSFOR SELECTEDSPACECRAFTCOMPONENTSBASEDON PRE-UPDATESAMPLE l iI
m on-orbit ,FailureRate
IFailures/MillionHours)
I Batteries 1.0 2.2 4.2
Decoders O.024 O.39 I.9 *
l CommandDistribution Units 0.50 2.8 8.g
Compters I.l 21 98
DC/DCConverters O.57 2.1 5.3 +
: l:
m Heaters O.Olg 0.36 1.7 i:-
Horl zon Sensors 6.1 18 41 : "/
/,Magnetic Tape Units 27 35 45
'iMotors 0.28 1.0 2.6 i' ,-I Oscillators 0.021 0.42 2.0 i
B Rece,vers 0.12 0.68 2.1 ii
Regulators, Pressure O.14 2.7 13
g ators Vol 0.26 0.77 1.8Regul taget
Telemetry Encoders 4.2 8.5 15
I Timers and Clocks 2.6 4.7 8.0
I Transat tters 1.8 3.0 4.8
Transponders 1.1 6.3 20
I Vidtcon Cameras 3.3 7.5 15
I
!
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[XIIIBITII - ON-ORBIT FAILURE RATE ESTIMATES AND 90-PERCENT CONFIDENCE I_
INTERVALS FOR SELECTED SPACECRAFT COMPONENTS BASED ON THIS [i ',
SAMPLE , ,_
• c
- ii'
On-Orbit Failure Rate (Failures/MillionHours) "i
Component Xl _, X2 IJ .-
m_
Accelerometers O.lO 2.0 9.5 I) )
Amplifiers, (I) 0.033 0.64 3.0
lJBattery Charge/Discharg_ 0.020 0.77 1.8
Control Circuits
Battery Pa_':s O.Ol5 O.29 I.4
Control Ga._Assemblies 0.55 3.1 9.7 _ '_
JJ
Data Handling U.lits 0.067 1.3 6.2
Gyros O.076 I.5 7.0 _)
Magnetic Se..ing Devices 0.097 1.9 9.0
__ Ma,._eticTakeUnits 4.9 g.o 16.0 l
' I.lagnetometers O.067 3.7 lI.0
Radiometers 6.2 lI.0 19.0
Receivers O.025 O.92 2.4
# Regulators, Voltage O.021 O.41 2.0 El
Signal Conditioners O.lg 3.7 18.0
-- Sun Sensors 0.33 1.9 4.4
- |
, Star Trackers 1.5 8.2 Ig.O
Transmitters,S-Band O.65 3.7 12.0 i
11
Transmitters,other (2) 0.13 0.92 2.9
(l) The_e amplifiers do not include power amplifiers, i
. (2) These transmittersare other than: beacon transmitters,Doppler trans-
mitters, FM transmitters,S-Band transmitters,special purpose transmitters,
tracking transmitters,wideband transmitters, or vldeo transmitters.
B
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i EXHIBIT18 - _-ORBIT FAILURERATEESTIMATESAND 90-PERCENTCONFIDENCE :::(INTERVALSFOR .;ELECTEDSPACECRAFTCOMPONENTSBASEDON COMBINED .*+-_
SAMPLE !(:_:i'
I On-Orbi,FailureRaLe kFallureVMillionHours) i_+ . i,>C,
III +'+!+Comj,onents _L _ k2 '_+
Accelerometers O.08 I.6 /.7 .+_+
m i_Iplifiers,(I) O.0063 O.12 O.58 ._'
BatteryCharge/Discharge l_
l ControlCircuits 0.012 0.23 1.I
BatteryPacks 0.62 l 3 2.3 I_
• +_,
m commandDecoders O.O!4 O.26 i.25 ,,_
Comand Distribution I_I
l Units 0.3l 1.8 b.6
Computers 0.012 2 3 11 0 )_:
m controlGas Assemblies 0.65 3.1 9.7
l DataHandlingUnits 0.030 O.5g 2.8 _:
DC/DC Converters 0 022 0.84 2.2 !__+l Gvro_ O.29 I.7 5.2 ":i+,
Heaters 0.012 0._3 I.l I!_
IN MagneticSensingDevices 0.097 I._ 9.0
li/:m Magv_,._icTapeUnits 14.0 24.0 37.0 I+_
m
Magnetometers O.29 2.6 5.2 "_:i_
I MomentumWheel/Reaction I_l_m Wheel Assemblies 2.1 o.3 11.0
l Oscillators O.Olg 0.36 1.7
Radiovneters 6.l 1I.0 i8.0
O.34 O.86 i.BReceIvers
Regulators,pressure 0.021 0.40 1, _J Jl
I Regulators,voltage 0.30 0.75 1.6
m slgnalco,,_litloners O.Ob3 1.2 5.8 -
_ _ _ '_' C _ l_ _'_ "_ _ _ _" _ _ . ' ....
1979004282-085
Sun Sensors O.33 I.2 3.2 U
StarTracker 33.0 57.0 90.0
TelemetryEncoders I.6 3.2 5.8
Timersand Clocks 1.4 2.6 4.3
Transmitters,S-Band 1.2 4.4 ll.O
Transmitters,Special _ .
Purpose 0.14 2.8 1:3.0 _
Transmitters,Wideband 1.4 5.0 14.0 _ i_
6ransmitters,Video 2.5 9.2 24.0 ,:'
Transmitters,other (2) 1.4 2.3 3.9 _i_
Transponders O.45 2.5 B.0 "°_';
- VidiconCameras 2.2 5.1 lO.O U
Ii,l
(I) Theseamplifiersdo not Includepoweramplifiers, i_2 transm ttersare other than: be contransmitters,Doppler
l transmitters,FM transmitters,S-Bandtransmitters,special ,{_
purposetransmitters,trackl_gtransmltters,widebandtransmitters, @or videotransmi ters.
@
i
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The columnindicatingnumberof failuresalso representsthe _''_'
minimumnumberof part failures. A fallureis enteredin Exhibits8, g,
and 10 only if the part has failedcatastrophicallyfor no evidentcause.
The numberof part failuresis lowerthan the truevalue for at leastthe
followingreasons: (I) somepart failuresare neverdetecteddue to
minimaleffect,low-levelredundancy,etc., (2) so,hedetectedpart fail-
ures are not reported,an inevitablesituationwhere no formalprocedure
existsfor such reporting,(3) some anomaliesstronglysuspectedas orig-
inatingfroma part failuresimplycannotbe isolatedto the particular
part,and (4) many anomalousbehaviorsare noted for which it is simply
unknownwhetheror not a piece-partfailureis involved.
Tht_ all the reliabilitystatisticsderivedin this subsection
are feltto be somewhatlow comparedto the truepiece-partfailurerates
in space. To overcomethisbias,however,it is judgedthat an order-
f
of-magnitudeincreasein a11 the failureratesand failureprobabilities
in thissubsectionwouldbe more than sufficient.
ExhibitsIg, 20, and 21 presentthe on-orbitfailurerates for
piecepartsexhibitingone or more failures. No tablefor probability
of failureduringlaunchwas generated. Only fivepiecepartsincurred
failuresIn thisphase,one for each part. Thesepart typesand their
correspondingestimatesof q are:
PiecePart .q
Capacitor 3.7 x I0"6
Relays 8.0 x IOA°
Switches 5.8 x I0"_
Trar,sducers 1.9 x I0""
Trai_s;stors 4.9 x 10-6
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1 EXHIBIT19 - ON-ORBITFAILURERATE ESTIMATESAND 90-PERCENTCONFIDENCE
INTERVALSFOR SELECTEDPIECE-PARTSBASEDON PRE-UPDATE
SAMPLE
On-OrbitFailureRate U
(Failures/MillionHours)
BatteryCells 0.00087 0.017 0,080 B
Capacitors 0.00051 0.00094 0.0016
Diodes 0.00035 O.OOlO 0.0024 U
Fuses 0.064 0.23 0.61
• Integrated_ircuits 0.0022 0.0065 0.015
m Relays 0.00044 0.0085 0.040
Resistors O.O0000go 0.00018 0.00083
Soler.oids 0.028 0.55 2.6 g
• Switches 0.15 0,43 0.99 Id
Thermistors O.12 O.27 O.54
Transistors 0.00020 0,0011 0.0035 I
m TravelingWave Tubes o.ogl 1.8 8.4
' Tubes,SpecialPurpose 0.31 6,0 29
GeigerMuellerTubes 5.4 16 36 _
Photomultiplier Tubes O.24 4.7 22
mi
U
g
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i EXHIBIT20 - ON-ORBITFAILURERATE ESTIMATESAND 90-PERCENTCONFIDENCE }_INTERVALSFOR SELECTEDPIECE-PARTSBASEDON THIS SAMPLE
I
i On-OrbitFailureRate (Failures/MillionHours)
Piece Part Xl _ X2
g
BatteryCelIs 0.013 0.075 0.23
O Capacitors 0.0001g O.0011 O.0033
O Diodes O.00012 O.00067 O.0021
; I Fuses 0.0080 0.045 0.14
R IntegratedCircuits 0.000034 0.00066 0.9042
":I Switches 0.020 0.40 l.g
I Transistors 0.00029 0.0016 0.0051
i Tubes,GeneralPurpose 0.27 1.0 2.6
I
I
I
I
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EXHIBIT 21 - ON-ORBIT FAILURE RATE ESTIMATES AND 90-PERCENT CONFIDENCE iJ, ;_:
INTERVALS FOR SELECTED PIECE-PARTS BASED ON COMBINED i-!_
tJ
SAMPLE
- On-(_rbitFailure Rate (Failures/MillionHours) _ I_
Piece Parts Xl _ X2 _!
tl
Battery CelIs 0.0|0 0.037 0.097
Capacitors O.00057 0.0010 U.0016 -- !
Diodes O.0004Z O.00097 O.0019 ,"
Fuses 0.036 0.090 0.19 :_ _,i_,
Integrated Circuits 0.00099 0.0025 0.0053 .,
_witches 0.18 O.47 O.98
Thermistors 0.U53 0.12 O.24
[ransistors O.00050 U.0015 O.0033
lubes, General Purpose 0,15 0.55 1.4
Tubes, Special Purpose 0.23 4.39 21.0
GelgertluellerTubes 5.4 16.0 37.0 _' _"
Phot_11ultiplierTubes U.24 4.6 22.0 _ I_
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_I F. MISCELLANEOUSSTUDYFINDINGS I_:_-- This section discusses six observations of interest that do not I_
fit in the formalized analyses of the previous subsections. Other study ._._
B findings of this nature but involving more detail are presented in the
six Experience Bulletins, as described in Section IV. _,
It should be noted that these observations are typical of the
types of specific findings that can be obtained from data bank analyses. __
_ Dependingon the depth of detail desired, the analyses can be basedon _:
B 'the raw data presented in AppendixA, or on data from th_ EAR's. The oh- _
servations discussed below should be of general interest. Other ubserv- _:
ations or findings can, of course,be otained in response to specific _,_
I queries or needs.
(1) Redundancy: As found in the three previous datP bank
II studies,redundancyplayedan importantrolein reducing
the effectsof an anomaly. Thereare 45 instancesin this
I updatewhere "block"redundancypreventeda more serious
i effect. Thereare also 68 more instanceswhere the ser-
iousnessof the anomalywas alleviatedby "backup"other
t thanblockredundancy.Such backup,whichwas most often
possibleon the more complexspacecraft,consistedof
I eitheran alternatemeans of accomplishingthe same func-
tionor "workaround"proceduresdevelopedfor ground
I control.
I
I
I
,11 i, , m
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(Z) Self-Healing: The apparentself-healingcapability
whichhas beennoted In previousdatabank studieswas
againobserved. In the updatesample,therewere 34
instancesof anomalousbehaviorthatclearedup without
ony typ_of i,te,'ventlon.
(3) Aging/Wearout:As indicatedin previousdata bank reports,
aglng/wearoutdoesnot appearto be a problem. Six in-
M stancesare reportedin thisupdate,with two of theminvolvingradiometersand one each a battery,a star
tracker,a tubefilament,and a plasmaexperimentpackage.
(4) Ground/OperatorErrors: Anomaliesin thlscategoryhave '_
not been observedto any significantdegreein the past '_
cJ
databank studies. Due in partto themore complexspace-
J craft included in thisupdate,30 instancesare reportedinvolvingground/operatorerror,and anotherflveare
11
reportedinvolvinggroundsoftware.
(5) Intermittent/DegradedOperationPriorto Failure: There
_I havebeenanomaliesInvolvlngintermittentor degraded noperationpriorto "failingsolld"in all previousd_ca
bank samples,but theywere not previouslytabulated.
J In the updatesample,17 suchinstancesare reported.
a
(6) Test-RelatedAnomalies: In the updatesample, thereare
"- 30 anomaliesthatare knownto be relatedIn some fashion
to the testing program. There are undoubtedly other anom-
k
aliesof this typein the updatedata, b.t specificlnfor- i
matlon is given only for the 30, _ )"K
1979004282-092
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These 30 anomalies can be classified as follows: 9_
l e II anomalieswere knownto existpriorto launch _)jc
• 3 anomaliesexistedprior to launchbut were undetected ,'_
I • 8 anomalieshad also beenseen in test _
• 6 anomalieswere attributedto inadequatetestingor test ,-_
I procedures
• 2 anomalieswere attributedto damagecausedby testing
_'_
1
!
l
!
|
iI
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I IV. SPECIALSTUDIES _(
l In eachof the four datacollectionefforts,with the exception
l of the third,a specialstudyor two was requestedby the contracting
agency. In this updatesix experiencebullJins were requestedto en-
l couragehigherreliability,more consistentperformance,reductionin
I humanerrors,and reducedcost in NASAproject;. Specialstudiesre-
gardingdormancyand the relationshipof programsuccessto qualityas-
surancefactorswere also requested. The latterelementwas treatedin
the firstcollectionas well. The seconddatacollectioneffortbriefly
I treatedOormancyand on/offcycling. The resultsof thesestudiesare
l presentedin thissection. SubsectionA dealswith the questionof dor-
mancy,and presentsdataat the spacecraft,component,and plece-part
I level. Subsection B presents previously derived results relating to on/1
off cycling. SubsectionC treatsthe relationshipof reliabilityand
I qualityassuranceto spacecraftmissionsuccess. SubsectionD briefly
summarizesthe most cogentfindingsof the six experiencebulletins.
All uf these special studies dependon the preceding sections
i of thisreport,the'basicengineeringanalysisreports(EARs)for thei
various programs, and, to a lesser extent, the basic documentstion as-
-I sembled for this study. These special studies are indicative, there-
fore, of the information which inheres in the entire space data bank both
I
1As'indicated in the introduction to this report, there have been several
I independent analyses uf the data bank and these are reported separetely(References 4, 5, 6, I0, I1, IJ, and 14); only those analyses perform.ed
in conjunction wtth a collection effort are tncluded in thts section. ..; _;_:"'
I
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with respectto its positiveattributesand its limitations.By the very I
natureof the study,theretendsto be some informationapplicableto
nearlyany relevantquestion or problemarea,but for only a veryfew I
questionsmay largequantitiesof data be anticipated.Not unexpectedly,
the morespecificand narrowlyfocusedthe questionor subjectarea,the I
scarcerthe directlyapplicabledatabecome. I
A. DORMANCY I
Reliabilitydataon domancy and standbyoperationof spacecraft
componentshas been collectedand analyze_in all fourcollectionefforts I
associatedwith the space databank, Unto,this update, however,no co_- '1
pilationof dormancyinformationat the "largequipmentgroupor space-
craftlevelwas posslble. As describedin the followlngsubsectionthat i
situationhas changedand profilesof severalspacecraftare available
which includelong periodsof dormancy. The traditiona'Icomponentand I
piece-partdormancyanalysistis providedin SubsectionIV,A.2below. I
I. Spacecraft I
Significantperiodsof dormancy_ere ...:.,,:,'.'atedb._nine
spacecraftin this update. The spacecraftare: SER', i", _0-._,_iOS-Z, g
MarinerI0, SAS-B,LANDSATI, SMS-Iand Z, and GOES-I. The ._.__a,+cyas- l
sociatedwith these spacecraftInv:}Ived the =.ntirespace(rJ;t_,.4 cases
and dormancyof major equipment groups in five cases. E_c_;)_ for short I
periods of operation and checkout twice a year, SERT-II has been essentially
+,.
+
_ +
1
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domant for over six years. GEOS-2was reactivatedand checkedout after L_
a non-operatlonalperiodof almosttwo-and-one-halfyears. 0S0-5and SAS-B {_
"/2
Were reactivatedand checkedout afteraboutone-ana-one-nalfyears of _.
domancy. ._:
_-
It Is of interestthatthe dormancyinformationavailablein the
updatedatarevealedno reliabilityproblemsthatcould be attributedto _,
,_ dormancy. Only one anomalywas reported to nave occurred during a dot- (_._
mant period;the failureof a flatteryon SERf-If. Sincethls battery _i
g ._had operatedbeyondits expectedllfeat ti_a(,pal,t,thereappearsto l)e !_?
no relationship between this fat lure and the effects of dormancy. _I
SERT II was launchedin February 1970 and carried
i two ion thrustersas itsmajor payload. Thrustori f=!l_ afterfive-
and-one-halfmonths in orbit,and Thruster2 _fterthreemonths. In beth
cases,thrusteroperationwas temlnated due to a hlgh-voltageshortacross
the thruster grids. Since thruster restart was still posstl)le, a series
of turn-on tests ;_'ereconducted in 1971 in an attempt to clear these shorts.
These tests were unsuccessful and the spacecraft was placed in a storage
mode.
_] By 1973, proposed electric propulsion missions included a need to
restart tl_rusters many times. Therefore. the stored SERT-II spacecraft
was re-activated (even though well beyond its one year design life) tu
g demonstrate multlplerestart capability and to conduct various other
evaluations of thruster components.
|
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Duringthis1973reactivation,each thrusterwas successfullyre- .,.
started112 times. Inaddition,the basicsubsystemsprovidedth{ r_quired !'_support. The 1973test programwas terminateddue to otherpriorities "'
for the ground-supportequipment.
By 1973,SERT-II'sorbit had precessedsuch that the sun angle
Uwas obl;queand inadequatesp_c.-zraftpowerwas predictedfor 1974.
r_ Therefore,at the end of the 1973test program,maneu_,erswere executed U
to obtaina new spacecraftorientationfor testingin the 1974to 1976
period, ii
In August1974,SERT-IIwas again reactivatea.Duringthese3974
tests,the hlgh-voItageshorton Thruster2 was cleared,returningit to
,- normaloperation. Multiplerestarttestsof both thrusterswere also con- U 7'i ducted,as well as testsof spacecraftelectricalpotentialcontrolvia ,,
the neutralizercathode. The spacecraftwas shut downSeptumber29, 1974. _j }
During1975,the spacecraftwas turnedon and the basic subsys-
temscheckedout in the springand againduringNovemberand December,
I when the thrusterswere also tested. Beginningin 1974,thishas become
the establlshedpattern. That is, the spacecraftis checkedout and l
!
" the thrustersfiredduringthe fall/winterperiodwhenarray power is IJ
adequatefor thrusterfiring. Aboutmidwaybetweenthe annualthruster
• firing the spacecraft is activated and the basic subsystems checked out.
A key activityoccurringduringthe springoperationIs the resplnning 8
of the spacecraftwith the gas attltud_adjustment_ystem. It was ois-
covered that SERT-II desptns due to someunexplained phenomenomand must B
be respunevery six monthsor so to maintainits spin-stabillzation.
!
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Thisdata baseupdateincludesdata throughthe reactivationIn _
1 Augustof 1976. At thattim, all major subsyst_s r_ained functional.
1
It is also knownthatSERT-IIwas reactivatedin 1978and thatall major )
subsystemsr_air_H functional.
• m Onlyone anomaly--failureof a batte_--is reportedto haveoccurr_
1 duringany SERT-IIdormancyperiod. This batte_ was a 40 _pere-hour _
F
:m silveroxide-zincbatteryof the type thathad been usedon the Mariner :i
program. The batte_ was reportedto be capableof at leastfivedischarge
m cycles.
:m The batte_ was fou, to be dead {failed)at the end of the first )
:|
_mant period. The batterychargerwas turnedoff at this_int.z
P
_e batteryis reportedto have o_rated beyondits expectedlife
, prior to the firstspacecraftshutdown. Therefore,It se_s doubtfulthat _.
doman_ conditionsareln a_ way relatedto the batte_ failure. _
The otheran_alles on SERT-IIoccurr_ duringoperationalperiods.
Theyare all of the _pe routinelyobservedIn data bankevaluationsof
operationalspacecraft,and againse_ c_pletely unrelatedto dormancy.
_e SERT-llgasattltudeadJustmntsystem seemsofspectal interest
In dormancyconslderatlons.Itwas Intended,and Ind_d originally
• called,the backup reacqulsltloncontrolsyste (_CS). It Is quitesl_
tlar _ the syst_s used in Surveyor. It has _en used thr_ times _r
r_rtentatton maneuverswtth the last of these _neuvers being tn August
of 1976. Except for these brief periods of operation (i.e., a f_
momentseach) thts syst_ has been In a domant state since the spac_raft
was launched. _ere are no re_rted an_altes chargeable to thts syst_.
1979004282-098
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b. 0S0-5 i
The fifthOrbitingSolarObservatory(OSO-5)was
ID
turnedoff December31, 1972 so that its transmissionswould not inter-
ferewith the newer0S0-7. 0S0-5was reactivatedearly in July 1974when I
0S0-7reenteredthe earth'satmosphere.Thus,OSO-5 was do_mantfor about
a
a year-and-a-half(546days). Whileanomalydata are not availablein the J_
data bank for thisdormantperiod,it is knownthat the basic subsystems "j_
D
remainedcapableof supportingthe mission.
The followingexperimentswere operableJuly 25, 1974:
o SolarX-RaySpectroheliograph
e_
o ZodiacalLightMonitor
o SolarLymanAlphaTelescope l
c. GEOS-2
When the GEOS-3spacecraftbecameoperationalin
April 1975,the GEOS-2experimentswere no longerneededand _hey were _
all turnedoff. The lasertrackingreflectorexperiment,a passivedevice, II|
continuedto be usedby groundstations. The basic spacecraftcontinued
to be monitoredand ,atelemetryreadoutwas takenabout twicea week. I
In the fallof 1977 it was proposedthat thisminimalmonitoring
11i
be stoppedand the spacecraft"turnedoff" completely,About thissame m
time it was reporteathat the lasertrackinghad becomeunusableand there-
forethe decisionwjs made to deactivateGEOS-2. It was also decidedto g
activate and check the status of as manyexperiments as posstble prior to I[
the spacecraft shut down. Unfortunately, the necessary ground equipment
1979004282-099
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j associated with several experiments had oeen scrapped and only the Doppler
I Belcons and the C-band transponders could be activated. Bothexperiments
were found to be in good condition and oper¢ le. At that time, these
I experiments had been dormant for 28 months.
i d. Mariner 10
The MarinerI0 ultravloletspectrometerand In-
fraredradiometerexperiments,as well as the TV subsystem,were turned
l off (dormant)for major periodsof time duringthe mission. In addition,
one redundantradiofrequencysubsystemexciterand one redundantportlon
l of themodulation/demodulationsubsystemwere turnedoff at any give,
l tlmeduringthe mission. Therewere no part failuresexperiencedIn
those equipmentsduringthe time tlleywere turnedon or off.
I
e. SAS-B
I The SAS-Bgamma-raytelescopeexperimentfailed
i l early In themission. Since thlswas the only experimentcarriedby
SAS-B,the spacecraftwas deactivatedand thenused as a trainingald
I as the needarose. It was reactivatedfrom Africaabout two-and-one-qw
i haltyears post-launchand all basicsystemswere normal. It had been
:1 dormant (turned off)for about ,8 months at that time.
l
f. LANDSAT-I
_-- Redunclantunits in two equipmentgroupswere
:. switched tnto service after long periods of domancy on LANDSAT-I. A
reOundant S-band receiver/transmitter was turned on after J,st short of
J_
]979004282-]00
PRC R-I,'163
" 11
I!
twoyearsof domancy. Also. a _dundant RateMeasuringPackagewas (_
switched into service after approximately 26 months of dormancy. The 1_1t_
data bank contains no reported anomalies on these previously dormant
equl_lentgrOUpS, _U i_"! g, SM.S_GOE_
_heSMS/GOESprogramconsistsof Iong-llfe,geo- _]
stationaryweathersatellites. All subsyst_s were designed for a satel-
lltelife tlneot fiveyears an_ containconsiderableredundancy.Many
of theseredundantele_1_ntson SMS-I,SMS-2,and GOES-Inave experienced
periodsof dormancyfollowedby nol_1_1operation. GOES_?(launchedJune
16, 1977)has not yet accumulatedany significantdornw_ncyperiods.
¢I
On SMS-I,a UHF receiverand an S-bandreceiveroperatednormally
after dormancyperiodsof approximatelysevenmonthseach. OnSMS-2,a VHF
transmitteroperatednormallyafter tourn_nthsof dor_b,mcy,and an
irl
._-bandrecelveraftersix months. On GOES-I,a UHF receiverwas dormant
lot sevenmonths,then operatednormally.Also, a VHF transmitterwas ._
ill
donnantfor two periodsof threemonthseach, and operatedwlthoutfault
atter both periods, 1
i
?, _o.,_oD_e,t .and.piec.e_Pa_t_. I
The pruBarydata regardingdo_w_ncyor standbyoperation
II
for cmtponentsand pieceparts is sumarlzed inExhibit22, The exhibit
showsthe numberof Itemsin the sampleof thisup(late,the pre-update I
sample, and the combined sample together with the number of orbital hours
I
I
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g
the itemsin each categorywere known to havesurvivedin space in a non-
f operatingcondition. Onlyone item (a battery)is evensuspectedof failing I
. duringdomancy or standbyand even _r this batterythere seems to be no
causalrelationship.An explicitcalculationof failurerates is therefore I
inappropriate.The sheernumberof hours accumulatedagainstsome items,
B
however,indicatesthata ratherlow ratewould be appropriate.
Exhibit23 tabulatesthe upper90 percentconfidencelimiton the I
' dormantfailurerate for selectedcomponentsand piecepartsusing the
B.t combineddatabase. For comparativepur_ses, the upper90 percentcon-
fidentlimiton the overallon-orbitfailurerate is also presented. U
The generallyhigherdormantfailurerate limitsimplyreflectsthe re- _
duced amountof dataavailable,but for _ny componentsand pieceparts I
the failurerate limitsare quitecomparable.For threehardwareelements jthe dormantfailurerate limitis actuallylessthan the overallon-orbit
limit. These threeelementsand their failurerate statisticsare:
FallureRate {Failures/MillionHours)
_rmancy On-Orbit
g
HardwareElement x__.2_2 x_..]_l _ _x2 0
MagneticTapeUnits 4.5 14.0 24.0 37.0
m
Transmitters,Wideband 6.3 1.4 5,0 14.0 J
Vtdtcon Cameras 8.2 2.2 5.1 10.0 _1J
For vidiconcamerasand wldebandtransmitters,the upper failurerate
i
confidencelimitsare aboutequal whichonly indicatesthat dorman_ is I
probablyno _orse thangeneralon-orbitexperience.The Ma9neticTape I
Units,_wever, indicatea clear cut failurerate reductionfromdormant
I
L__ ....
•- i_, "..... _" . ' ,,, ," L , • ." ; . ,
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I
EXHIBIT 23 - COHPARISONOF UPPER90 PERCENTCONFIDENCELIHITS FORDORHANT L
I ANDGENEnALON-ORBITFAILURERATES
7"
.o
Upper 90 Percent Confidence Limit on
FatIureRate (Fat Iures/Ht 11ton Hours)
HardwareElenen__ _ Dormancy On-Orblt
i Components _Amplifiers (1) 7.2 0.58
BatteryPacks 1_.0 2.3 :
I CommandDecoders _. 2 1.25mand istribution Units 16.0 5.6
Cr,mputers 3800.0 11.0 ._
I DC/DCConverters 5,3 2.2Gyros I0 0 5 _'_
Heaters 2.4 1,1 _
I Magnetic Tape Units 4.5 37.0 _Osct11ators S. 1 1,7 _"Recetvers 7.1 1.8
Regulators, Volrage 3,6 1,6
I TransmItters, gt deband 6.3 14.0Trans itters, Other (2) 1.3 0.043 "_
Transponders 11.0 8.0 ,..
I Vtdtcon Cameras 8.2 1O.0
Piece-Parts
I Battery CelIs O.76 0.097 --Capacltors 0.010 0.0016
Otodes O.0059 O.0019
I Fuses 1.3 O.19 _::Integrated Ctrcut ts 0.035 0.0053 -
Relays O.25 0.029
I Switches 1.4 0.98Themtstops 1,2 O,24
Transistors 0.0093 0.0033
I Tubes, General Purpose 1.5 1.4
uqmu
Notes: (1) These amplifiers do not tnclude power amplifiers.
I (2) Thc,;e transmitters are other than: beacontransmitters,Doppl_ertransmttters, FMtransmttters, S-band transmttters,
special purpose transmitters, tracktn9 transmitters, wide-
I _nd transmitters, or video transmitters.
1¢p
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operations;a reductionfactorof nearlyI0 to 1 is indicated. It is U
therefore reasonably clear, and madeclear by demonstration from actual
@J
field data, that dormant failure rates are lower for somecomponentsthan
1
generalin-orbitratesanclhence lowerthanoperatingfallurerates. B
_m_
o
It is reasonableto conjecturethataclditionaldatawould extendthis
: conclusion to other componentsas well.
In adOttlon to the above data, two additional reports relateo to
dormancyand reltabt Itty cameto light In the course of the data bank
2
studies. The flrst of these uses a two-year set of Oata from the space- B
craft knownas ESSA2 through ESSA9 with particular emphasis being given
i to the vidlconcamerasand taperecorderson the AVCS satellites(ESSA _
3, 5, 7, and g). Both dormant and operating data were found on these H
B
componentsand were analyzed. The conclusions from tht_ analysis are
: as to1 lOWS: g
"Forthe vidiconcamerasand taperecordersof the TOS satellites
designated ESSA3, S, 7, and g, correlatlo;, analysis was done using the
•:_ data available on these subsystems in a': attempt to establish a relation-
: ship between pattern of use and subsystem performance and between pat-
tern of dormancy and subsystem performance.... No distinct otfferences
_ in correlation were found between "good" Subsystemsand "bad" ones.
B
IThls ts true slnce the tn-orbtt rates are based on a combination of
poweredand unpoweredhoursin unknownratios.
2StanfordResearchInstitute,A Studyof Domant-_de Reliabilityfor U
the TOS SatelliteSystems,Robert;. R.atnerand C. Br-uceClark,January
l_jTO'_'-(_t_ia-l-l_eportOh contract NAS12 33 (Item 10) SRI Project 5580). I
'i
l
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result. The first is that the data availableare not completeor extensive _:_.i_
I enoughfor _ statisticalanalysis. The secondis thatthere is no rela-
i iI tlonshipbetweenperformanceand operation. Thirdly,the correlationsdonemay not be sufficientlysophisticatedto revealthe relationship
I presei,t.Fourthly,the componentswe are dealingwith appearnot to be
samplesof a largerpopulationin a statisticalsense--thatis. each
I component is sufficiently different so as to obscure any relationships
i between them."The secondreportis from the AerospaceCorporatlonI and concludes
"aNN I _
on the basisof a theoreticalanalysisthatdomant and operatingfailure
ratesfor electronicparts tend to equalityas partqualityand application
I conditionsimprove. The followingtabulationof Q-factorsts offered
where Q-factoris the ratioof domant failurerateto operatingfailure
I rate.
I Q-FACTORSAS A FUNCTIONOF PARTQUALITY
_ualt__ Level _Factor qual ity Requirements
Mil-Std 0,1 ttilltarySpecification qualitycontrolwith
no additionalscree,lng.
I MI1-Std-Aug O.5 MI11tary SpeciflcationqualIty controlaug-
mentedby specialrequirementsand some
I screening, f-Hi-Re1 0.8 Rigorous Specifications,stringentmanufac- _L
turtng controls, excessive screening.
[The AerospaceCorporation, Report No. TOR-O177(?133), Failure Rates l_I of Non-Homog neousParts Populations, A.C. Reed, 15 Septemb r il97],
I |
!
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B. ON/OFFCYCLING U
_._ Related study efforts bearing on this subject area which _ _,
utilizethe spacedatabank are reportedin References4, S, and 6. [_il
References4 and 5 are sequentialeffortsdevotedto the :.;ll-bllity {( _
_L
effectsof groundstorage,spacedormancy,standbyoperationar_Jon/-ff cm _*
cycling on satellite electronics. Reference 6 discusses the reliability
of spaceborneswitchingdevices. As outllnedin the prevlou._reports _L*
and confirmed in this study effort, defining the suoject matter in
_. clear and unambiguousterms is the mostdlfficultpartof the problem. _ _.
This difficultyis a functionof the dynamicbehaviorof nearlyall _
orbitingspacecraftand particularlythe more recentand complexsatellites. _ _'_._
Eachmajor subsystem may be characterized by a numberof operational modes, .. i_
many componentsare normallysubjectto cyclicaloperation(forexample, H _i_*
the recordand playbackcycleof taperecorders,batterychargeand dis |I _
IFi*
chargecycles,etc.) and configurationchangesvia the ground/spacecraft ,_i
lh
are commonon nearly every pass. To conKooundthe problem there _
link
are rarely sufficient data to quantify any of the parameters associated _ ,
with the above operation (time spent in playback modeor record modes, lU i_
numberof playbacks, operational hours per mode, etc.) .11 ,_;i
IU
The approach taken to surmount this difficulty is that used in ;,
all four study efforts. That is, reliance is placed on "known" values, I _}*
with engineering assumptions being kept to an absolute minimum. When _ !ii:,M i
available program documentation provides clear and reasonably straight- _ i :*i
forward data rexjardtng the cycl ing of spacecraft components, tt ts re- I I '_
[
ported; otherwise, it is not. [_
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Exhibits 24 and 25 summarizepertinent data with respect to on/ _ _) " i
off cycling and standby operation. Only data points which were sufficiently
well documentedto provide a complete ltne of information in these exhibits i _"i
were included. By the sametoken, the data presenced in these exhibtts I
are all that is available from the dat_ bank which carries all the data t -J_ '
f
elements identified in the columnheadings. Twoexhibits were constructed |_ j
to serrate thosespacecraftcomponentsbuiltwith the laterintegrated .J :
circuittechnologyfrom the earlierspacecraftconstructedprimarilyfrom _ :
discreteplece-parts.There are 142 entriesrepresentingthe earlier • .
technologyand 49 representingintegratedcircuitcomponents.The corn-
- ponenttype is quite wriable rangingfroma 20-piece-partpowercon- /
I verterto an entirespacecraftconsistingof some ZO,O00electronicpiece-
parts. The namesof the componentsare purposelykept somewhatgeneral; ,,,
I however,theiruse in conjunctionwith the columnindicatingthe number
/
of
D
discreteparts (or integratedcircuits)containedin the componentshould
J gi;ea reasonableideaof its generalcharacteristics. L
I The survival hours represent the time thet the componentunder
considerationwas knownto be operable. Power-ontime is the numberof "
i + : ,
hoursthat fullo nominalpowerwas appliedto the component. Survival
hours minus power-on hours gives the time that the componentwas dormant ';
or on Inactlvestandby.1 The numberof cyclesis essentlallythe number ,,
I of turn-ons,i.e.,switchingfrom Inartivestandbyto full.no_.Inalpower. .;:
It is not too unreasonableto assumethatthe on periodsin eachcycleare _C
approximately_ual,
J )'The tem "dormant"and "inactivestandby"are consioeredto be synony- _mous n this re_ort,
El
L,_L ..... ,
i
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The final column ltsts the numberof anomalies. All recorded _ !_[_ _!
instances of anomalistic behavior recorded against the componentsof _ . , _.interestare listedhere. Componentsfailingcatastrophicallyare as :_"
follows,discretepartcomponentswhich failedcatastrophicallyat the _
indicated survival hours are those represented by the index numbers: 6, I,-
35, 36, 109o 111, 113, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, and 133 (Exhibit 24); U
catastrophically failing integrated circuit componentsare listed as in-
dex numbers19, 32, 33, and 47 in Exhibit 25.
The most notable feature of these data, taken as a whole, is U
the generallackof anomalisticbehaviorassociatedwith the cycledcompon-
ents. Not evident from the exhibits is the fact that noneof these B
anomalies can be attributed, unambiguously, to the cycling itself or to
the domant period of the component's operational profile.
Comparing the data of Exhibits 24 and 25 to the survival data I
includingall kindsof operation,there is no strikingor statisticallysig-
nificantdifference. There are, for example, 51 transmitters represented i
in Exhibits 24 and 26 with a total of 455,779 survival hours, no cata-
strophic failures, 1 and 27,517 on/off cycles. In terns of survival hours
this represents a go percent confidence tnterval on the fatlure rate of
0 to 5.1 x 10"6 fatlures per hour comparedto the interval of 1.5 to
3.9 x 10.6 failures per hour that maybe foundfrom the data of Section I
III for all tranmttters. These results are not unexpected given that
the t_o populations are essentially equal in terms of failure rate. To
L
IAlthoughthereare I0 anomaliesrecordedagainstslx integratedcircuit
transmitters, noneof these resulted in the temlnatlon of transmitter
.,: operat ions. I
B
LIL_
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I deduce from this example that cycled and uncycled components,which are
l otherwisesimilar,havethe samefailurerates is not warranted,however,
on two counts. First,it is not unlikelythat all the transmittersin-
l cludedin the SectionIll analyslswere cycledto someextent,those
I representedherebeingsimplythe transmittersfor which quantitative
cycleddata are available. The secondproblemis the sparsityof failure
I datawhich tends to make all failureratecomparisonssomewhatnebulous.
It is ratherclear,however,thatcycledcomponentsin generaldo not
I have "orderof magnitude"higherfailureratesthan theirnoncycled
counterparts.Theremay well be compensatingtendenciesin the cyclicmode
l of operationin that turninga componenton and off may be detrimental
to reliabilitywhereasperiodsof no or reducedstress(ie.,"dormancy")
I may be beneficial. In the analysisof Reference5, the detrimentaleffect
of on/offswitchingwas found for the variousscientificexperimentpack-
m agesof an observatoryclass satellite;the beneficialeffectsof _ormancy
l were not found. These relationshipsare repeatedhere in Exhibit26. The
dataon spacecraftcomponentsshown in Exhibits24 and 25 were analyzed
l in a mannersimllarto thatwhich producedthe resultsof Exhibit31.
First,however,the dataof Exhibit24 was furthersubdividedto
separateou thosecomponentswhich represententirespacecraft.Three
l setsof data thenresult,two from Exhibit24 and one from Exhibit25.
The firstset consists_f cycllngdata on componentsprimarilyconstructed
l pieceparts (Exhibit24). secondset (Exhibit25)of discrete The is slml-
lar but the componentsare constructedprimarilyof integratedcircuits,
I The lastdata set (Exhibit24) is thatrepresentingcycllngdataon entire
I
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spacecraft all of which, coinctdentally, are constructed primarily of ,_m
l discrete piece parts. There are 130 data points tn the data set for i_
discrete part components, 49 for Integrated circuit componentsand 12
for entire spacecraft.
Dividing power-on time by survtval time and multiplying by 100 ,_t I
-- gives the duty cycle for each component. Cycltn9 rate is the numberI
_m
i of cyclesdividedby survivaltime. The distributionof the numberof
I anomalies, failures, survival hours, and numbersof components, ts
given for these two variables for each of the three c_ta sets. These
I distributions are shown tn Exhibits 27, 28, and 29. Exhibit 30 sums _
these distributions across componenttypes.
An anomaly rate (or a failure rate) may be obtained for any corn- _"
I binationof cyclingrateand duty cyclegivenby simplydividingthe nm- _ibet of anomalies (failures) appearing in the appropriate cell of the upper ¢*')
I matrixby the numberof survivalhoursappearingin the samecellof the
lowermatrix. For example,the anomalyrate for Integrated circuitcom- ))_
I ponentswitha cyclingratet, etweenonecycleper thousandhoursandone i_,
cycle per hundred hours and a duty cycle between 50 and 90 percent ts| '-givenby 9/239292 - 38 anomalies per million hours. The corresponding •
I failure rate ts 4.2 failures per mtllton hours; both esttmtes are based l_l
on data from 17 components.
I Since there are generally so few anomalies associated wtth each I
Individual cell tt is recommendedthat anomaly or fatlure rates derived
I as In the example be used with somecare. Exhibit 31 presents these
I
I rates for the mrgtnal and overall totals.
!
i,,
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I With respect to duty cycle no clear cut trends are evident, For
both integrated circuit and discrete part components the maximum ano_ly _,_
I (and failure) rate occurs at the minimum duty cycle. For the discrete !_
part components there is clearly a strong correlation between low duty _,
m cycle and high cycling but this is not the case for integrated circuit C_-)
I con'.ponents.
As regards cycling rate the data show a general decline in anomaly _(
m rate with increasing cycling rates from very low values of cycling rate '-_
up to about one cycle every I0 hours. No data beyond this point are
I
available from entire spacecraft and no failures or anomalies were found
I against integrated circuit components at rates of cycling faster than once _'I
in lO hours. For discrete part components a large increase in both _|
I anomaly rate and failure rate is noted in this region. Theories to ex-
plain this phenomenon are left to the reader as an exercise, li_
I To determine if component size (i,e., the number of piece parts
m a component contains) influences the results, the tabulation oi"Exhibit _ "
32 was constructed for discrete part components. Although the general
I pattern noted earlier carries over here (l.e., a decreasing anomaly rate l i
wlth increasing cycle rate until a cycle rate of 0.I cycles per hour is ) i
m : cLreached at which time the an_,_alyrate increases drastically) the only i i
I clear conclusion that can be drawn on the basis of the data is th:_tcycling
in excess of 0.I cycles per hour is worse, from the point of view of _
I reliability, than cycling at a lower rate, To see this more clearly _:_.
consider the following two-by-two array based on anomaly rate.
__| ;
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,. ICXHIBIT 32 ,. ANOMALY AND FAILURE RATES AS A FUNCTION OF' _
, GOMPONENT SIZK AND CYCLINQ RATE _ ra
0.00001_r 0.0001_r 0,00|_r 0.01-_r 0,1_r _ i
,_°_' No, of Anomalto_ 0 0 | ! 6 S _
_m
_ga, No. ,_t Fitlur_# 0 0 1 0 Z ._ ..|
'_ ]_ No. o_ GvJmpo.ont_ l 7 10 23 _1 7_.
_ Surviv_lHourm 1120Z 57_a 1_9694 31487l 1S4884 66787q
_ knosualy Rate $ 0 0 7, 7 _, 2 _9 12F'allur_ Rate * .7 0 1_ 4.5 _
m No. of &nom_lies 4 l 0 3 2S _4
_"No, o_ Corap_n_nt. _ l I _ _ s8 !_
_o_ Survival Hourm 7S07Z 390_6 19518 11_080 Z677a7 5174_ _ I__,,
Failure Rate * 0 0 0 8.8 _6 1,q I_-
r.
|_
|-
- :.= _2:-:: __; __ : : ..... - : r
_Anomal¥ and faUure rat_# given in occurrencem l_r million hourm. N -
N
g.J_, 1
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ComponentS!ze
CyclingRate, r
I _(cycles per hour) <150 Piece Parts >150 Piece Parts
O.1 < r < 1 39 39
m r < 0.1 2.0 36
I EXHIBIT 33 - ANOMALYRATE1 ASA FUNCTIONOF COMPONENTSIZE ANDCYCLING
l RATE
It is not clear on the basis of the foregoing whether cycling
per se is detrimental to spacecraft components,comparedto steady
stateoperation;it is reasonablyclear,however,that if spacecraft
componentsare to be cycledit is desirableto reducethe cyclingrate.
I C. RELATIONSHIPOF PROJECTSUCCESSTO PRODUCTASSURANCE
I Product assurance elements are defined here to include the reli-
ability, qualityassurance, and relatedactivitiesconductedfromdesign
I and developmentthroughthe finalcheckoutof the spacecraftat the
launchsite. An attemptwas made in this updateto collectthiskind
I of information;the resultsare summarizedin Tables5 and 6 of the en-
I gineerlnganalysisreports(seeAppendixB). This informationis less
available,more unevenin qualityand considerably .,.quantitativethan
i the other data elements collected during the study. Muchof the informa-
Lion, for example, comesfrom contractor "in-house" documentation which
I is difficult to obtain once the spacecraft contract is closed. Also,
I manyof the spacecraft tn thts update have evolved through long-term, i_!I,i
I Anomaly rate is given In anomalies per million hOUrS.
I
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on-golngprograms(theNOAAspacecraft,for Instance,evolvedfromthe _
earlier TIROSarid ITOS spacecraft). In these cases, the traditional _ _
R & OA activities tend to be mtntml, wtth evaluations of actual operating _
perfomance servtng tnstead as a basts for corrective acttons. _ _
Of the 42 spacecraft added to the data bank on thts update, vary-
ing amountsof Tables 5 and 6 data were available for 30 of t_m. In
somecases the data can only be described as sktmpy; in other cases thetables contatn a fatr amountof data11 |n someareas and 11ttle or no
detail tn others. In a few cases, data coverage is detat!ed for all
pertinent areas. Thts ts the samesituation that was encountered dur-
ing the first data bank study. (On the two subsequent data bank studies, I
R & _ Info_tlon was not soughtslncethe obJectlbvesof thosetwo
stud|esdid not _qulre It.)
i The previous attempt (durtng the first data bank study) to relate I
product assurance to project success was relatively unsuccessful. All
spacecraft programs were rated as to thetr "success" by classifying them
as "marginal," "successful," or "outstanding success." Then ratings 01r I
a similar type for the sameprogramswer_ developed for the following
product assurance elements: 8
e DevelopmentTestlng
e Parts, Selertlon
e Qua11_ Cr,ntrolProvisions
e Off-the-'_helf Versus NewDestgn
;_ • Prelaur,ch Actlvltles I
!
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e SpacecraftComplexity
l • State-of-the-Art
Attemptswere-thenmade to findsomecorrelationbetweenthe programsuc-
I cess ratings and the for the variousratings product assurance elements.
Correlating techniques such as regression analysis were applied, with the
result that no well defined, quantitative trends could be identified. At
the time, this lack of measurable correlation was attributed to lack of
good data.
I It was felt that this situation have been remedied in thismtght
study, but unfortunately il was not. In fact, the approach developed ear-
l lter was determined to be inapplicable to this update for two reasons:
i (1) the programs represented in the update were generally quite successful,
and (2) for all programswhere the data are available, at least a serious
R & QA existed. The resulting situation is that there are notprogram
sufficient "gradations" in the update data to allow for a meaningful
l scale of comparisons.
l With respect to the data on R & QAprograms in this update,
three basic approaches were noted: (1) on low-budget programs, use of
l previously qualified hardware and designs was emphasized; (2) onspace
the program with fewer budgetary restraints and, concommttantlx, more
l complexspacecraft, more testing was conducted and more stringent R & QA
m controls were implemented; and (3) on long-term programs where spacecraft
1
evolved from earlier designs, the emphasiswas on evaluating actual or-
bttal performance to provide a basis for corrective actions. The suc-
cess of the spacecraft represented in this update would indicate that
!
!
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W
eachof thesethreeR & QA approacheswas adequatefor its associated
situation. _ i_
D. EXPERIENCEBULLETINS i
Thls subsectionsummarizesthe six ExperienceBulletinsprepared
as partof the specialstudieson thiseffort. These bulletinsare based t_
on engineeringanalysesusingthe databank as a resource,and highlight
areas thatwarrantincreasedconsiderationon new projects. The six
ExperienceBulletinsare providedin AppendixD. Their major findings U
are summarizedbelo',. _}
_Ex__oerienceBulletin#l: PersistentOn-OrbltProblemAreas
u
Analysisof the updatedota for spacecraftlaunchedin the lg70s
i indicatesthatanomalytypesthat havebeen persistentin the
C pastare stilloccurring. Eightcategoriesof these persistent fib
* anomalytypesencompassapproximatelyone-halfof all anomalies.
E_rience Bulletin#2: Some On-OrbitReliabilityAspectsof I" -_ Int gratedClrcu_ts -
The data bank containsinformationon over lO0,O00integratedclr-
cultswhich accumulated2.0 x I09 survivalhourson-orblt. These
data indicatethat the orbitalreliabilityof an integratedclr- R
cult is quite similarto thatof a transistor.Also, there is
some evidencethat integratedcircuitshave reducedthe number
of problems associated wlth circuitdesign.
ExperlenceBulletln03: Areas Wlth a Historyof Few On-Orblt
; Prob_lems
_ Evaluation of the data bank indicates that most spacecraft hard- _1
ware areas have incurreda numberof anomalles. Six areaswere U
I
Identified, however, that have essentially t,-ouble-free histories.
• !
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I
I ExperienceBulletin#4: On-OrbltInterferenceR_ From
• _urces "
l The databank containsat least20 cases of problemsin space-
craftRF equipmentdue to interferencefroma sourceexternal
I to the affectedspacecraft. In some cases the externalsource
was anotherspacecraft;in somecases the sourcewas unknown.
Analysisindicatesthat thistypeof incidentis increasing.
I ExperienceBul1_tln#S: SomeOn-OrbitReliabllit_As_.pectsofOn-_-Boardl_rogra_ma-b_e_-GT_-n'era_P-urge
_-TE_rs
l This updateis the firstdata bankeffortin whichdata fromon-
board,programmable,generalpurposecomputersbeganto become
I available. Thi_ limitedamountof data indicatesthatthe space
environmenthas not introducedany unusualtypesof anomalies.
The capabilityfor reprogrammingin-flightis recommended.
I E._xperienceBulletin#6: SpecificOrbitalAnomaliesPosin_
"Po-tent i a1 R-_"t-a_)_1-it¥ "P'_b'l'en{s--
l Threespecifictypesof anomalieswere noted on this updatewhich
had not been seento any significantextent,if at at1,on previous
a databank studies. These includearray temperaturesensorfail-
ures,leaksthroughthinwindows,and thrustercatalystbed
i susceptibilityto RFI, These anomalytypesmay eitherdenote
l the beginningof a trend,or signifysome basic,underlying
problem,
I
|
I
I
L
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I Appendtx A ,
ANOKALOUSINCIDENTSLISTINGS
I Thts appendix ts divided tnto four sections--one for each
m previous data collectton ef_:)rt (References I, 7, and 9) and one for
this study. The sections and their respective data sets are as follows:
I (I) 1967 Study (Reference 1)
(II) 1971 Update (Reference 7)
I (III) 1972 Update (Reference 9)
l (IV) 1978 Update (Current Study)
Each section contains two parts that include part (a), the **
I basic data tabulations; and part (b), classification codes. There-
fore, for example, Appendix A-Illb contains the classification codes
I for the third data set. The contents of these parts are discussed
r
J I below. ,/i.| I PART(a),:, BASICDATATABULATIONS
Thts part contains, tn tabular form, the basic data referred to
I tn Sections II. 111, and IV of this report. The tables presented here
will provide the reader with a meansto understand the compilation pro-
- I ordures used tn thts study and facilitate any further classification or
" 1 analysis of particular interest to the individual.
The first step tn the data reduction procedure (using the Engt-
neertng Analysis Reports described tn Appendix B} _s to produce a l tst-
trig that contained the following data elements associated wtth each space-
"" m craft of the staple: (1) unsuccessful launch, prtmrtly due to the launch
I ,, q,,' .,,r,_",),,>
- ' r 1
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vehicle;(2) successfullaunchwith reportedanomalies;and (3) success- _'
ful launchwithno reportedanomalies.
The tabulationof thissectionlistsfirstthe unsuccessful I_
- launches.Reportedanc_aliesare listednext,orderedby time of occur- _
renceand containingthesedataelements: :_
%,
e Time-to-occurrenceof anomalyin hours. A time ¢ is _ i_
. associatedwith the launchinterval,priorto injection _
IIintoorbit. The symbol _ denoteseitherunknowntime ,_
or intermittentoccurrence.
• Threeshortphrasesindicatingthe descriptionof the ob-
servedanomaly,its suspectedor knowncause,and the
effecton themissionobjective(s).
• Correctiveactions,both in-orbitor for subsequent
launches, if known.
• Briefremarks,if neededto placethe anomalousincident
in context. B
The lastgroup,successfullauncheswith no reportedanomalies,
ends the basicdata tabulation.Dataelementsfor thisgroup are (1)
whetheror not the spacecraftis stilloperationaland (2) totalspace- j
crafttime includedIn thisstudy.
The sequential coding, the index ltsted in column 1, provides a I _..
means of crossreferenceto the tablepresentedin part (b) of the re- Z_
!
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: I I rAfT_Lb.):..CLASSI_Ut:A.t.t.O.N___?ES _!!This part tS a ltsttng of classification codes for each of the ._;
,.&.
anomalies of the basic data tabulations tn Part (a) of the sectton. For !i_.
I convenience, the identification of the anomaly characteristics discussed i,'_in Section il of the text and the alpha-numeric codes employedare re-
I peatedat the end of this Introduction, _-
NOTE: The following matrix shows the index numbersof anomalies that )_
were updated In subsequent reports. For example, the anomaly __
which corresponds to index number _2 in the 1971 report ,_
v_-*.
I (Reference ?) is updated as index number 3 in the 1972 re_rt _(Reference 9). ._t,-
I |9;tIo.U_.d#te 197.__2U_d.ate .Cu_:rent5t,3d2f_
# 22 # 3# 130 # 27
# 9 # 16
I # 18 # 70
# 23 # 83
I # 33 # !21# 36 # 124
I # 37 # 12548 70
# 108 # 406
# 127 # 447
I
1
5
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ANOMALOUSINCIDENTCLASSIFICATIONCODES B
I. Mission Subset c. Power Supply
I
U. Unsuccessful Launch d. Attitude Control and
Stabilization _,
S. Spacecraftwith No
AnomaliesReported di Propulsion
Spacecraftwith
AnomaliesReported e. EnvironmentalControl
II. MissionTerm f. Structure
w
L. Long Term g. Payload{Experimental
and Scientific)S. ShortTerm h. Unknown
III.MissionPhase
L. Launchand Acquisition Vl. A. l_cidentType
E. Electrical
O. Orbital(Steady-State)
M. Mechanical
Q. Unknown
O. Other
IV.MissionEffect I_
U. Unknown
I. Negligible
VI. B. IncidentType
2. Non-Negligiblebut Small
C. CatastrophicPart
3. I13 to 213 MissionLoss Failure
4. 2/3 to NearlyTotal O. OtherPart-Related
MissionLoss Incident B
5. EssentiallyTotal N. Non-Part-Related
MissionLoss Incident
U. Unknown U. Unknown I
o
V. SpacecraftSubsyste_ VII. IncidentCause
a. Timing,Controland A. Assignable
Command
N. Non-Assignable Ib. Telemetry and Data
Handling U. Unknown
I
I
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l Appendix BENGINEERINGANALYSIS REPORT
I
A. INTRODUCTION
I This appendix describes in detail the data recorded on the working
i papers generated for this study. Using the available documentation for
each spacecraft in the data sample, these working papers, called engineer-
I ing analysis reports, were produced for each launch in the data bank. Not
all the data described below were available for each spacecraft.
I
B. Engineerin9 Analysis Report
I. General Data El_ments
I Each engineering analysis report begins with a short gen-
eral description of the spacecraft and the main objectives of its parent
I program. This introduction also includes a short narrative of the flight
experience of the spacecraft and the time interval covered by the subse-
quent pages of the report.
I Table I lists general information needed for the analysis: (l)
name of the mission; (2) the launch vehicle, with a brief description of
g an abortive launch if one occurred; (3) launch date; (4) orbit parameters
including information relative to incorrect orbits due to launch vehicle
g malfunctions; (5) name of the sponsoring agency and prime contractor;
g (6) an overall evaluation of the in-flight performance; and (7) program
objectives as given by the program office. _
!
m
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. H
TABLE I - GENE_L INFORMATION H
MI:_ION: 0
LAUNCHVEHICLE: 0
Describeabortivelaunchif occurred. H
ORBIT PARAMETERS: g
AGENCYAND PRIMECONTRACTOR: g
PERFORMANCE(Werethe FollowingObjectives_t?): g
PROGRAMOBJECTIVES:
I
I
I
I
I
I
i
g
B
H
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l
2. Reliabi|itx Data Elements
Data elements needed to perform the pertinent reliability
analysis were entered in three tables of the engineering analysis report.
Table II contains the hardware breakdown to two levels of indenture: (I)
subsystems, i.e., power subsystem, timing, control, and command subsystem,
etc.; and (2) equipment group and/or component, i.e., solar array, bat-
teries, command receivers, beacon transmitters, etc. The list of subsys-
tem names varies by the complexity of the spacecraft under analysis; the
precise definition of the subsystems, that is, those functions assigned
to a particular subsystem for purposes of this report, are found in sub-
section I|.D.2. The equipment group or component list also is dependent
on tileparticular spacecraft under analysis. It is important to note
that tileintention here is to define the second-level indenture so that
the number of powered and unpowered hours (columns 2 and 3 of Table Ill
are applicable to all piece-parts within the given grouping. That is, the
level of group or component definition is such that all constituent parts I'
1 operate on the same duty cycle. !:
Redundancy among equipment groups and/or components was taken into f
considerationwhen entries to columns 2 and 3 were made. If the documen- ;7
ration was such that each unit in a redundant configurationwas known to ei"
have survived say l,O00 hours, then 2 units are entered for 2,000 hours _
, • , _.:
However, if all that is known is that the redundant configuration survived, __
m then the entry is I unit for 1,000 hours.
The purpose of columns 2 and 3 on Table II, powered and unpowered ,_
I hours, is to obtain data from which "standby" reliability might be esti-
?-
mated. Again, it is emphasized that only known hours for the two
I
I
•m _i'i-T--i_
"_!i_ " ' _ ' _,,m'__,.., ,_ " "_ll_"" " 'fill 'i_l_l_ r
i 979004282-3G8
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I classificationsare recorded. Assumptions concerning duty cycles were
limited.
I Column 3 on Table II, number of cycles, was used for those hard- '_.
Lware groups for which the relevant variable is cycles or actuations.
m other columns in the exhibit are self-explanatory. The reference ,:
m column was included so that the source of the data underlying the results
could be easily identified. It is noted that this "traceability" is pre- ' ;
t
I served on all working papers thorughout the data analysis; for example,
a1! anomalous behavior classificationsare coded so that any question
I concerning data classificationor assumptions can be answered by search- _Ii1 i;_i,
I ing back to the original entry in the engineering analysis report. !
/
. Table III shows another format in the engineering analysis report
I uoed to record the number of piece-part types for each higher level group- liili"
ing of hardware shown in Table If. Thecolumn labeled la, for example, I_iiI,:_..
m is the first equipment group or component in the first subsystem listed
m on Table II. A "total" column was F "ovidedfor those spacecraft where
a parts breakdown by equipment group or subsystem was not available.
m The l_st of piece-parts varies not only by spacecraft but also
by the available documentation for the spacecraft. By far the most dif-
m ficult data element to obtain was the spacecraft parts list; also the
: level of detail given on parts lists that were obtained was very sparse.
I With some exceptions, subgroupings within a part type were not avail°
:i able. For exan@le, the total number of resistors used in the space-m
i craft was generally known, but the types of resistors was not specified.|
,l The resulting analysis is necessarily limited to the generic part
_I nomenclature.
1979004282-370
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TABLE III - PARTSBREAKDOWN
Total
Number Numberof PartsPer Subsystemand
of Parts EquiPmentGrp.up/Component
(Codedas on Table I)
Battery cells la lb lc ... 2a 2b 2c ... 3a 3b 3c ... U _
Bearings
Capacitors _ ,-Diodes,
Semiconductors i"
[.
_.
!1 ':
-- ll!il
a
. II
_e
t_
|i
I
!
B
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i Table IV showsthe formatfor recordingspacecraftanomalousbe- I{
havior. The descriptionincludesa narrativegivingthe consequencesof _:"
it ,
, the anomalousbehavior: for example,(I)effecton the mission(cata- _;
strophic,negligible,modifiedby actionsperformedby groundstations, _/
l etc.),(2) effecton other hardwaregroupings(inducedadditionalanoma- C_
l lousbehavior,lossof equipmentthroughdeliberateshutdownby ground ,"_
't)
stations,etc.),and (3) implicationson subsequentlaunches(corrective '/i
l actionson hardware,changesin orbit parameters,etc.). Provisionwa._ :_.{
made in the finalcolumnfor any other pertinentcommentrelativeto the .-_
1 overallstudy;of particularimportanceare any commentsrelativeto as- -_'
',C
l signablecausesfor the anomaly. Finally,the _nomalousbehaviorevent .:?
is referencedon each of the threetables. (Thiscross-refe:'o_.c_,igaids _i'_
I the anomalousbehaviorclassificationstabulatedin textSectionsII, III, ",iii
and IV.) i'_
I In thisconnection,it is emphasizedthata particularanomalous II'_I_,.
behaviorevent is not necessarilyattributableto a particularpiece-part. _:
I In fact,only a few sucheventscan be attributedto a particularpart- IT
l typeas suggestedin Table III. In most cases,however,anomalousbe- _T_
havioreventscan be assignedto hardwareat the subsystemlevel and in _'
I many instances,at the equipmentgroupand/orcomponentlevel (TableII).
3. Developmentand PrelaunchElements
I The developmentand prelauhchelementswere definedin
the earlierstudyby meansof fivepotentialfactorspresentin these
two intervalsof a spacecraftlifetime. These flvefactorsare listed
1
I
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] TABLEIV - ANOMALOUSBEHAVIORDESCRIPTION _ :"
Time to _'
FaiIure
laentification (hours) Consequences Comments
H ,
|_
(2) _ i
it
N
N
• |
I
N
n
_"" _" r _ 1979004282-373
! i
_J .....[ I II i i I I _.I!_ I i _"I_"!_l"l"'I._,_ _ _._. _ i i •
I PRC R-1,%3379
I
I in Table V together with a brlef description of the specific information
required. -i.
I Prelaunch activity is explained on Table V!. Basically, this table
discusses tests and checkouts conducted prior to launch. }
I 4. Su_mma._._F_y_ i
i The four tables just described and the general data ele- ,
ments discussed above comprise the dat_ tomat used in this study in pre-
I paration for the data analysis. The _":rststep in the analysis procedure :
was to generate the anomaly listing; this listing becomes the data basis |
I for the analysis of Sections IT, Ill, and IV of the text.
I ,
i
I
| , I;
I '!!i I 'i 1
_ t
l
I _I\-
I I,1
I
I 1.
I t
I i
I
: L
.__777"777 77777_ 7-:_1777-'_-_
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TABLE V - DEVELOPMENTACTIVITY
gl
m
, t.. TESTING U
: Narrative indicating items subjected to tests, duratiun of tests, I "_"
: testing of new items, etc.
B. PARTS SELECTION 'l _ "
Descriptionof types of specifications part screening parameter ,':_' } :2
drift screening, etc. I _I_.[_,'
C. QUALITY ASSURANCE PROVISIONS ".;._'g'_
• Description of quality assurance procedures imposed on or by the
: contractor, i.e., NPC 200-2 or 200-3; special provisions, etc. I "_:,_;:"....' ,_
D. OFF-THE-SHELF VERSUS NEW DESIGN ',-,. "
IEstimation of the percentage of equipment groups in the spacecraft ,::-, ,.:
that can be .lassifiedas off-the-shelf versus new design. Note i]]."
th,,ta* a part level almost all can be considered "off the shelf," ,,,.,,
and at a subsystem level almost all can be considered "new design." g ,,:_';_:_'
,:.,_
I "_'2
• r :l
_l_
h'
]979004282-375
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I
I TABLF VI - PRELAUNCH ACTIVITY
I TEST AND CHECKOUT
Description of the extent of test and checkout at the launch site; i"
I *I!description of types of tests, record of anomalies durin9 this
I period; description of mating problems if any, length of time ii
interval, etc.
I
, F
i
I
, iI
I
!
!
I
i
!
I1
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_! Appendix C :
DATA BANKCOVERAGE .;:
| "
INTRODUCTION -'| "
The chart in this appendix lists the spacecraft in the data bank.
The spacecraft are arranged in numerical order by EAR numbers -'
For each spacecraft, the chart shows the launch date, spacecraft }..
status, and the degree of completeness of the tables in tne EARI. For _'
- i some of. the spacecraft, not all the infomation was available and for
unsuccessful launches, some of the tables were not applicable, i.e.,
I Table II: Operating Time; Table III: Parts Breakdown; and Table IV:
Anomalous Behavior Description.
I
!
I
I
I
0
I
I lsee Appendix B of this update for a detailed description of the EAR,
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:1 ExperienceBulletinNo. 1
l PERSISTENTON-ORBITPROBLEMAREAS
l
_l August1978
:I
i PreparedunderContractNo. NASW-3041,
I "Studyor ReliabilityData From In-FlightSpacecraft"
: m for
•l NationalAeronautics& SpaceAdministrationNASA Headq arters,W shington,D.C.
m
l
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,
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A Note on the Data Base for this Bulletin i
The Space Data Bank from which the results m
in this bulletin were derived is presented Iin PRCR-1853, On-Orbit Spacecraft Reliabil-
ity, September 1978. For purposes of back-
ground to this analysis, it need only be
pointed out that the data bank contains Ig
orbital performance data spanning spacecraft
from Vanguard to HEAO,a period of nearly m
20 years. Four primary data collection I
efforts have been made. This experience
bulletin has been written in conjunction m
wlth the most recenteffort. The first |
three coilectionsanalyzed]399 anomalles
from 310 spacecraftlaunchedbetween1958
and 1972. The most recentcollectlon
added informationon 708 anomaliesfrom II
45 spacecraftlaunchedin the seventies.
These data are referredto hereinas III
"thisupdate." |
L.....
I1
O
U
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Experience Bulletin ._I
I PERSISTENT ON-ORBIT PROBLEM AREAS
I Iknalyslsof On-orbit data for spacecraft launched
: ii_ the 1970s indicates that anomaly types that have been
m persisteut in the pa_t are still occurring, The analysis I!;" fm'ther indicates that eight categories of these anomaly
: types enc_npass approximatel) one half of all anon,alies,
I . xNJR92LLCTJON
I In an earlier analysis of the data bank, it was found that over
I ,'_0percent ot all anomalies fell into 30 categories of leading probl(_nl
areas. It was also noted that these categories represented "persistent"
iI probl_._,sin that tileant_alies occurring on the mot_ recently launched
spacecraft were ot the same types as the anomalies on earlier spacecraft.
lib
I Since a signiflcant ali_untof new data were collected on this data bank
i update, it was deemed desirable to re-e×amine these persistency trends.lhe findings of this re-examination, as described in mo_ _.de-
tail below, _ndicate tl_atthe types of problems dL_}1onstratingthis per-
sistence in the past are still occurring. In other words, even tl_ough
state-of-the-artadvances have occurred, they have not resulted to any
- noticeable extent in "new" or d_fferent types of anomalies. Nor have
they resulted in significant elimination of "old" types of anomalies,
It was also found that the top five persistent problem categories, i.e,,
tl}oseaccounting for the five llighestanomaly counts, have not signifi-
cantly shifted to lower rankings. In seven other categories significant
shifts--both up aud down--were noted.
Blotwnqulst,C.E., and Winlfred C. Graham, Ana!_sls of S_pacecraftAnomalies,
PRC R-1833, PRC Systems Sciences Compan_. Ma_li-19_[b--...........................
1979004282-392
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I
m othersignificantshiftsincludestartrackersshlftlngfrom four-teenthto rankwith batteriesfor sixthplace,and ,Idebandtransmitters
I shiftingfromfourteenthto seventhplace. Also, deployablestructures
shiftedfromeighteenthto eighthplace,and non-degradationtypesolar
m arrayanomaliesshiftedfrom twenty-secondto tent)_place. Two shifts
i downwardthat appearto be significantare the shiftfrom sixthtofourteenthfor commandand controllogic,and the shiftfrom sixteenth
I to twenty-fifthfor commandRF problemsother than lock-on.
The accumulateddatabank informationregardinganomalytypes
m providesimmediatelyaccessibledata on rankorder,and shiftsin rank
i order. The reasonsbehindthese ranksand shifts,however,are not usuallydiscernablewithouta considerableamountof furtherresearch. As an ex-
I ample,it can be postulatedthat shiftsin equipmentmix contributeto
shiftsin rank order. I
I For instance,more widebandequipmentwas carriedon spacecraft !
,J
in this updatethan in the pre-update. However,only widebandtransmit- L._tl
tersshiftedupwardsignificantly;widebandreceiversand transpondersdid
I ,lotexhibitsucha significantincreasein numbersof anomalies. Another
ex_inpleinvolvesthe upwardshiftsin chemicalpropulsionand solararray
m anomaliesother thandegradation. There has beenessentiallyno shift
in the "equipmentmix" for these typesof equipmentbetweenthis update
m and the pre-updatesample.
I Similarly,the high rankof scientificInstrumentpackagescan
be attributed,in part, to the fact that,as experiments,theyare mon-
I ttored closely and anomalies are thus more likely to be detected and
I
I
 T,1
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reported. Also, many are built by universities and hence not subjected B
to the rigorous reliability and quality assurance provisions of basic
subsystems. This does riotappear to be the complete explanation, how- I
ever. Scientific Instrument packages were treated as basic subsystems _iII.in a number of cases (the interplanetaryspacecraft, for instance) an,i
still exhibited a higtl anomaly rate. I
An area in which the data bank is unequivocally instructive con- .,
terns the persistence of the anonlalytypes. This can be seen fronlEx- I _ '_
hibit 3, which depicts the occurrence of the top-ranking categories in ,#_
this update by year of spacecraft launch. I _.
These eigl_ttop ranking categories ai_etllose"above the medlan." I
Ilmt is, they account for approximately half the anon_iies in all 30
categories. As can be seen frt_nExhibit 3, tllesetypes of an_nalies have I
occurred fairly steadily on spacecraft launched over the !5-year period
fr_ml t960 to 19/5. I
!
IV, CONCLUSIONS
Analysis of data obtalned during this data bank update indicates i_
tllefollowing:
I. Anomaly types that have been persistent in the past are I
still occurring, I
2. Eight categories of these anomaly types encompass approx-
imately nalf of the anomalies. Five of these have not I
shifted slgnificantlyfro_ pre- to post-lg70 data; the
eight are: I
B
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• e Scientiflc Instr_,ent _ _, !.:
- e RFIIEMI
e Tape Recorders
. "! ile Propulslon Ichemical)e Batteries
e Star Trackers
e Wideband Transmitters
3. Upward shifts _i.e.. from fewer to more anomalies) that _
appear slgnlficant, together with their rank order shift,
incIude:
II
e Propulsion (chemical). from fifteenth to fifth
e Star Trackers, from fourteenth to sixth
e Wideband Iransmitters,from fourteenth to seventh
• Deployable Structures, trom eighteenth to eighth
• Solar Array (non-degradation).from twenty-second
Ill
to tenth
4. Dow,w,_.rdshifts ttlatappear significant include: E
• Command and Control Legic, from sixth to fourteenth
m
• Command RF (other than lock-on), from sixteenth E
to twenty-fifth
NAbA is currently developing a magnetic bubble type recorder at
least partially to allevlate the persistent problems that have plagued gqw
mechanical tape recorders.I The results of thls analysis suggest that
B
"---ISee',for in._tance,"NASA Tests Ma_.,.,tlcBubble Recorder," Aviation
W_eekand S_._ac/eTechnology, July 24, ',78. _l
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I c_parable ce'rective-_ctionprograms for s_ne of tileother leading
probl_n areas would be extre_ly beneficial. Regardless of whether this
I is feasible, the leading probl_1 areas certainly warrant increased atten-
tion during spacecraft des,gn and develop_nt.
m I
I
I
I
I
9
I
I
!
I
I
!
I
I
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Note on the Data Base for this Bulletin _.,. _A
-]
The Space Data Bank from which the results :'_
IIin this bulletin were derived is presentedin PRCR-1863, On-Orbit Spacecraft Reliabil-
ity, September 1978. For purposes of back-
ground to this analysis, it need only be I_
pointed out that the data bank contains U
orbital performance data spanning spacecraft
fromVanguardto HEAO,a periodof nearly ul
20 years. Fourprimarydatacollection U
effortshave beenmade. This experience
bulletinhas beenwrittenin conjunction
with themost recenteffort. The first
threecollectionsanalyzed1399anomalies U
from310 spacecraftlaunchedbetween1958
and 1972. The most recentcollection II
added informationon "08 anomaliesfrom U
45 spacecraftlaunchedin the seventies.
Thesedata are referredto hereinas
"thisupdate."
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I E_perience Bulletin #2SOME ON-ORBIT RELIABILITY ASPECTS
OF INIEGRATED CIRCUITS
I
The data bank contains informationon Rver I00,000
I integrated circuits which accumulated _.0 x 10:' survivalhm_rs on-orbit, These data indicate that the oroital reli-
ablliLv ot an _nCegr_ted circuit is quite similar to that
I of a trans_ster. Also, there is some evidence that inte-qrated circult._have reduced the n_l_berof problems associ-
ated with c_rcuit design.
I
1, INIRODUCTION
The up_Jateunder this contract marks the first of the four data r_-
_ teqrated circuits, It was therefore felt approprlate to examine the _
- I available integrated c_rcult data for the reliability insights it might k_
I 11. ANAL:Y:S!S.
At least "_
.,_of the 40 spacecrdft in this update sample used in-
I te,l,'atedclrcuits. S_1_espacecraft in the pre-update sample used inte- _i
qrated circuits, alti_oughnot to the sanw_extent as spacecraft in this 2
I update, I_
I Overall, the data bank contains orbital, operating information I_._i_
o_ at least I05,q98 integrated circuits. During the orbital time periods
I of the data sm_)le, these integrateO circuits accm,ulated at least I
_".0x lO9 survival hours. There were actually many more integrated I[_
I _:ircuits,a_d hence more survival hours, because some spacecraft for I
-I
!
,
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which partscountdatawere not availableare known to haveused integrated _ !_
W
circuitsextensively.
In both thisupdateand the pre-updatesample,only five integrated !_
circuitsare knownto have incurredrandom,catastrophicfailures(that
is, the typeof failureconsistentwith the definitionof the familiar _
failurerate, ._). Thisyieldsan orbital,integratedcircuitfailure i
rateof 0.0025failu_s per millionhourswith upperand lewer90 percent ,,
confidenceintervalsof O.OOb3and 0.00099,respectively.This failurerate _
does not differsignificantlyfromthe data bankorbitalfailurerate for
m
transistors(0.0015with 90 percentconfidenceintervalsof 0.0033and
O._)OObO).
i
Thereare at ledstthreeintegratedcircuitanomaliesin the data
bankthatdo not involverandom,catastrophicfailures. Two of these
were due to gold-to-alumniumbondingsettingup a reactionthatcaused
corrosion. The thirdwas due to an impropermanufacturingp_cess. The B
chipswerecleanedwith ammoniabut thenthe ammoniaresiduew not ade-
m
quatelyremoved,thus laterprovidinga mechanismfor alteringthe chip's
characteristics. The correctiveactionsderivedto eliminatethese
anomalieson subsequentspacecraftare reportedto havebeen successful.
Therewere undoubtedlyother integratedcircuitanomaliesin the I
data samplewhich were not identifiedas such. For instance,thereare
i
anomalousincidentsassociatedwith equipmentcontainingintegratedcir-
cuits,but it is difficult,if not impossiblein somecases,to determine i
if theywere due to integratedcircuits.
An observationof intereston this updatethatmay relateto in-
tegratedcircuitsinvolvesmarginalcircuitoperation. On previousdata I
1979004282-404
I PRC R-1863
415 I.
i bankstudies,there have alwayrbeen a number of anomalies due to inade- ;,iquate design margins, out-of-tolerance parameters under certain condi- _
l tlons, etc. While there were anomalies of these types on this update,
fewer were noted than on previous studies. It is not clear that this can
be attributed to integrated circuits. But, in contrast with discrete
part circuits, the fact that they do not require circuit analysis as part
of the design procedure would seem to eliminate some chance for error.
I
III. CONCLUSIONS
The orbital reliability aspects of an integrated circuit appear
to closely parallel those of a transistor. Their falure rates are net
I significantlydifferent, and while their tailure modes, as revealed by
l the data bank, are not similar, integrated circuits do not appear to
have introduced any "exotic" new failure modes that are beyond present
1 capabilities for foreseeing and correcting. In addition, there is
some possibility that they have reduced problems due to errors in the
I
1 design of discrete part circuits.
; I It is important to note that most, if not all, the integrated
I
circuits covered by the data bank were subject to rather stringent qual-
provisions. Thus, care taken in applying theseIty
assurance should be
conclusions to other classes of integrated circuits.
i -
t
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A Note on the Data Basefor thisBulletin _] _!
The SpaceData Bank fromwhich the results If._
in thisb,,lletlnwere derivedis presented _ L/ii_PRC R-1863,On-OrbitSpacecraftRellabll-
tty. September 1978. For purposes of back- _._: ground to this analysis, it need only eminte u thatthe data ba kcontains
: orbitalperformancedata spanningspacecraft i_
' fromVanguardto HEAO,a periodof nearly _] _20 years. Fourprimarydatacollection ....efforts have been made. This experience _i_
bulletin has been written in conjunction ;_I_
with the most recenteffort. The first
threecollections analyzed1399anomalies (_Li!_if,'om310 spacecraftlaunchedbet_en 1958
and 1972. The most recentcollection _] _;d ed informationon 708 anoma iesfrom
45 spacecraftlaunchedin the seventies. I_
Thesedata are referredto hereinas
• "this update." U I............................. U
It.
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Experience Bulletin #J !_I AREAS WITH A HISTORY OF FEW ON-ORBIT PROBLEMS
I
This experience bulletin Is based on the fact that information l_ f
I colll,'l_rnillkI are,is w_th |ew, lit' llO, I11"ohlelil,'_ l,':in [,le as USeful as tliat con,, f"-"
Ce|'llilltl problem areas, The areas listed below a,'e those revealed l_y the {il
data hank to have such a history of few, or no, on-orblt anomali,,s. An_ i__,
in,siqhts available from the data bank are also described. Tile _'rlleria ,:_
for s_,lectln_! tllese areas wa_ tll,lt the number of alll, lllla] Jl'_ chard,led I_ each !_i :.I
was fewer than one half of' a percent of tile total number of anon_llt, s _*_i
assoclated with long-te_, unmanned spacecraft in tile data hank, [!],
P:
I • Basic Structure {excluding deployable structures):
no anom,iI ies
I I Shrouds: two anL_nalles;sl_roudfailed to eject in one
I case; c_)rrectiveaction (cIlan,qefriwllfiberglass to metallic
sl_roud)was successful on subsequent spacecraft. Shroud
I llone,yc_l_b panels exploded due (o enviI'o_Itel}tal effects
during launch i_ the other case,
I • Pyrotechnics: two catastropl_Icfailures (failure of a
I pin-puller and failure of an explosive valve); a fewdegradation ano_lalies_c_Ibustlon debris shorted an an-
I tenna, a squib short after firing created a "sneak path,"
for instance); tlns performance record Is possibly due
I to the extensive redundancy utilized i_ipyroteclmlcs,
l Magnet.o_eters: Two catastrophic failures and several
I degradation an_,_lies which did not severely impact
I performance.
I
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• Nutation Dampers: no catastrophic failures; thre.;degra-
dation anomalies. The first involved a leak in the damper
that caused a significant roll error; thought tf be due
co extensive ground testing. Th- second involv/._da mech-
anical problem with a friction stop, and was a/tributed
I
to faulty workmanship. The third was manifesiledas ai B
slightly longer than expected nutation transient decay
time, and was possibly due to s(_1_edeviation/in liquid
viscosity.
• Heat Pipes: no anomalies, although it sho_Jldbe r.,)ted
that only two spacecraft in the data sample carried heat
pipes.
It can be seen from the above that few areas mee_.the criteria B
described above. This occurs for two reasons. First, a stringent cri-
teria was applied to ensure that tI_eareas meeting the criteria did in- B
; deed have allessentially trouble-free history. Second, and most impor-
tant, evaluation of the data bank indicates that most spacecraft hard-
ware areas have incurred a number of anomalies. This rules out describ- B
ing these area_ as trouble-free,even though a significant percentage
of these _nomalies did not severely degrade the mission. 8
E
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A Note on the Data Base for this BulleLi_.._nn
The SpaceData Bank from which the results m
in this bulletin were derived is presented l
.... in PRCR-1863, On-Orbit Spacecraft Reliabil- m
- try, September 1978. For purposes of back-
!
ground to this analysis, it need only be
_ pointed out that the data bank contains
orbital performance data spanning spacecraft
from Vanguard to HEAO,a period of nearly m
20years. Fourprimarydatacollection I
effortshavebeenmade. Thisexperience
bulletinhas beenwrittenin conjunction m
with the most recenteffort. The first •
threecollectionsanalyzed1399anomalies
from 310 spacecraftlaunchedbetween1958
and 1972. The most recentcollection l
added informationon 708 anomaliesfrom Q
' 45 spacecraftlaunchedin the seventies. )
These dataare referredto hereinas •
"thisupdate." I
................. I
I
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I The data bank contains at least 20 cases of problems in space-
m craft RF equipn_.nt due to interference from a source external to the
affected spacecraft. In _omecases, the external source was another
m spacecraft; in somecases the source was unknown. In addition, there
l are other cases in the data bank involving RF disruptions, but it is not
known if this was due to external interference. The cases involving
m interference from external sources reported in this update can be sum-
marized as follows:
m Hawkeye(Explorer52) experiencedlossof data due to
m interferencefromOSO-Sand 0S0-7;when the OSOswere
active, Hawkeyelost about 4 percent of each o_ttal
m period'sdata.
Hawkeyealso experiencedinterferencefromOAO and GEOS
m spacecraft,but this is reportedas relativelyinsignificant.
Interferencefr_nan unknownsourcealso caused"lost
m commands"on Hawkeye.
I RFI from an external source disrupted transmissions from
both VikingOrbitersfor a periodof 40 minutes.
m LANDSAT-Iexperiencedseveralperiodsof externalinter-
ference,includingone nlne-dayperiod. This resulted
I in loss of somedata.
m NIMBUS-6receptionwas affectedby interferencefrom
ATS-6 when thesetwo spacecraftwere being utilized
m
I
mmm,,----_,,...._ '.............
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F, I:LI!together for the Tracking and Data Relay kxperiement. _. ; i l :
This interfere,Ice was reported to be related to the ATS-6
operating mode.
l Although not an interference problem of the same type
described above, radloastronomers at the Greenbank Ub-
servatory noted interference from ATS-6.
The cases involving interference from an external source reported
and-one-half hours by a strong RF slgna! of unknown origin.
• OGO-6 experienced anomalous command reception, but no
further inforn_tion is available.
combinations of spacecraft on the TIROS/TOS/ESSAprogram, m |_"I ,Tli
For instance, under certain conditions, ESSA-9 responded u i_i_| _
to TIROS-M c._,ands ESSA-4 responded to ESbA-I commands _ l_:/
ESSA-5 experienced spurious commands when ESSA-2 was in II I!:I_
the vicin,ty, etc. Several of these cases of interfe,'ence _ !_,Im_
occurred when the spacecraft were being commanded from ,_.I ",
rAlaska. k: t_-
I OSO-I executed n_ny false commandsdue to some unspecified m .,-'/_:
II
type of interferenceover North Africa. This wa_ attrl- -- _: _*_
buted to an inadequateco(llngsche_, and the corrective _] _]_"
action consisted of placing a special transmitter near., I_'_c,
the site of the interference, No further tnfomatton _ _
!_" J"
B.!!iBi !f
i _
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It is not difficultto postulatereasonsfor many of the inte;'fer-
l ence problemssummarizedabove. Possibilitiesrange fro;nsolar flares
l and militaryelectronicwarfareexercisesto inadequatecommandcoding
schemes. Tilefactremains,however,thatthe databank indicatesexter-
nal interferenceincidentsare Increasing,and thatthey primarilyen-
compassRF problems(as oppos,dto problemsrelatingto codingschemes).
l This is contraryto what would De expectedsince the increasinguse of
I widebandshouldresultin lesscrowdedchanne_._and more channelselection
sensitivity.
I
I
I
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- !!- A Note on the Data Basefor thisBulletin
-;m
. The SpaceData Bankfromwhichthe results
in thisbulletinwere derivedis presented
in PRC R-1863,Or-OrbitSpacecraftReliabil- U
_ ity,September1978. For purposesof back-
.- groundto thisanalysis,it needonlybe
-Q pointedout thatthe data bank contains
orbitalperformancedataspanningspacecraft !
fromVanguardto HEAD,a periodof nearly m
20 years. Fourprimarydatacollection W
effortshave beenmade. This exoerience
bulletinhas beenwrittenin conjunction
withthe most recenteffort. The first
threecollectionsanalyzed1399anomalies m
from310 spacecraftlaunchedbetween1958
and 1972. The most recentcollection m
addedinformationon 708 anomaliesfrom E
m_ 45 spacecraftlaunchedin the seventies.
! Thesedata are referredto hereinas
"thisupdate." I
i
!
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I Experience Bulletin #5SOMEON-ORBITRELIABILITYASPECTSOF
ON-BOARDPROGRAMMABLE,GENERALPURPOSECOMPUTERS
I
Six spacecraftin the updatesampleare known
I to have carriedgeneralpurpose,programmablecomputers.While thisis too limiteda datasampleto justifybroad
conclusions,the datadoes seL_nto indicatethatthe space
I enviromlenthas not introducedany unusualtypesof an_;_-aIies. The c pabil tyfor reprogra lningin-flightis
recommended.
!
I. INTRODUCTION
I The timeframecoveredby thisdata bankupdateroughlycoincides
m with the early phasesof the era of readilyavailable,"off-the-shelf"
generalpurpose,prograJll_ablecomputersfor spaceapplications.Space-
I craftin the databank sampleprior to thisupdatefrequently
used
specially designed programmers, sequencers, controllers, and the like,I
I Only the latermannedspacecraftin the sample,however,carriedidenti-
•I liable,true,generalpurposecomputers,and theseunitsoperatedonly
I
for shortdurations. Hence,itwas consideredof interestto examine
_I theperformancerecordof thecomputersin the updatesample.
;I II. ANALYSIS
_I At leastsix spacecraftin the updat_samplecarriedgeneral
I
; purpose,programmablecom,puters. Some hardwareon otherspacecraftcalled
I out as programmers,controllers,etc.,may alsohave beengeneralpurpose
Iw
computers,but sincetheywere not clearlyidentlflableas such they
were not consideredin thisexamination.
1979004282-417
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The computers on the six spacecraft, including three cases of |I
dual redundancy, accumulated over 80,000 hours of survival time. Eighteen
anon_lies are charged against the computers, with the anomalies falling
into the followi,g categories: Ill
e 5 anomalies: "glitches";caused no major problems
e 4 anomalles: programming errors; reprogrammed in flight
: m 5 anomalies: Erroneous operation of undeterminableorigin;
caused major concern; "self neallng" _!t°
e 1 anomaly: Program updates did not load on initial
tries; subsequently loaded properly;
cause unknown
e 3 anumalies: Memory probl_ms; seriously degraded
performance U
Of the five above categories, the first four are felt to be
lhe fifth, memory problems, requires further explanation []seIf-explanatory.
_: Of the three anomalies in this category, one involved too small a memory fl
for computing fine pointing increments,with the result that only coarse
steps were available. The second of these anomalies involved loss of
access, tor reasons that are not clear, to a portion of memory, filethird
involved failure of four memory blts, pnssibly due to a failed wire in
the plated wire memor).
These 18 anomalies, in general, are typical of the types of prob- r_
:, lems routinely encountered wlth ground-based computers. That is, the
B
space env1rorm_entdoes not appear to have i_;roduced any "new" types of
ane_alies. With regard to severity. Lne anomalies associated with the
qW¢
memory problems caused degradcLion. It appears that the four programming
_, error anomalies would a'.sohave resulted in degradation had reprogramming B
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431 _.
m iiotbeen possible. All other"anomaliescan be classifiedas intermittents :.
I
that,aftervaryingperiodsof time,did not recur. At least halfof
I thesecould haveposedseriousproblemshad theycontinued. _ _:_I
With respectto the numberof anomaliesreported,the recordcan ._'_._
best be judgedby comparisonto othercomponents. Therewere also 18 _ 2"I
i anomalieschargedagainsttelemetrysensorsin thisupdate,yet there are _ _
at leasttwo ordersof magnitudemore telemetrysensorsthancomputers _I|{_]
IK_
I in the sample. There are 15 anomalieschargedagainstsun sensorsin "i!7
I
the update,which alsoconsiderablyoutnumbercomputers. This,of course, [._l_
I H"doesnot accountfor complexity.Commandand control,which is more
i equivalentin termsof complexity,had slightlyover twiceas many anom- [_7t7i"
alles as computers. Again, however, commandand control functions greatly
I outnumbercomputersin the data sample. Basedon thesecomparisonsas well
as considerationof the 80,000hoursof survivaltime, 18 anomaliesseems
I a somewhatlargebut not excessivenumber,
m someof theseanomalies,however,appearto be typeswhich,as
k
more experienceis gained,may be successfullymitigated. J_dgingfrom
I groundcomputeroperations,programmingerrorswill alwaysoccur to some
extent,and can be mitigatedby reprogrammlng.Also Judgingfromground
I operations,"glitches"becomelessprevalentas the hardwarematuresand
interfaceconditionsare betterunderstood.This suggeststhat,with
I the properimplementation,on-boardcomputerscan becomeextremelyreliable.
, I
I II. CONCLU_____SIONS_
m Overa11,the data sampleis too limitedto Justifybroadcon-
m cluslonsas to the on-orbitreliabilityof generalpurposecomputers.
I
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It does, however, appear to support the following conclusions based on the _ r_i
current state-of-the-art:
• The space environment does not seem to have introduced I _"
any types of computer anomalies that differ significantly
; from ground-based computer anomalies.
)
• On-board computers should have the capability for repro- _ !_
grarmlingin-flight. _,
. • Properly designed and implementedc_*puter hardware and _ _
software promises to substantially increase the reliabil-
ity of control functions.
Jl '
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A Not_._eeon th_._eData Bas___efo_._rthi__sBulletl_____n I
The Space Data Bank from which the results
in this bulletin were derived is presented Iin PRCR-]8E3, On-Orbit Spacecraft Reliabil-
ity, September 1978. For purposesof back-
ground to thts analysis, it need only be
pointed out that the data bank contains I
orbital performance data spanning spacecraft
from Vanguard to HEAO,a period of nearly
20 years. Four primarydatacollection I
efforts have been made. This experience
bulletin has been written tn conjunction
with the most recenteffort. The first Ithree collectionsanalyzed1399 anomalies
from310 spacecraftlaunchedbetween1958
and 1972. The most recentcollection
added information on 708 anomalies from I
45 Spacecraft launched tn the seventies.
These data are referred to herein as
"this update." I
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I Experience Bulletin #6_PECIFICORBITALANOMALIESPOSINGPOTENTIALRELIABILITYPROBLEMS
I Three specific types of anomalies, which had not been seen to
m any significantextent,it at all, on previousdata bank studies,were
noted duringthisupdate. On the basis thattheymay eitherdenotethe
l beginningof a trend,or signifysomebasic,underlyingproblem,each is
i describedbelow.
I. Arr_r_ay_Temp.eratureSensors: Two spacecraftin thisupdate
samplehad arraytemperaturesensorproblems. On one of
thesespacecraft,four sensorsfailed-openafterfirst i
operatingintermittently.On a secondspacecraft,four
l arraytemperaturesensorsalso failed,and thiswas attri-buted to insufficientbuilt-instrainrelief. Thereare
m _ numberof anomaliesin the data bank involvingtemper-
ature sensorsin general,and severalotheranomalies
I involvingarray temperaturesensorsspecifically.How-
l ever,the occurrenceof theseeight array temperature
sensorfailuresover a shortperiodof time standsout as
l unique.
2. LeaksThroughThinWindows: In the totaldata bank,
m thereare fourreportedincidentsinvolvingthinwindows.
Ihesewindowsare typically1.5 to l.g micronsin thick-
ness,and are usedas "inputpo_ts"in experimentsand
l detectors. Threeof these Incidentsoccurredon space-
craft in thisupdate. The firstinvolveda brokent _anlum
I
m
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window,and the reasonfor this breakageis unknown. In _ :
the second,in anotherexperiment,the thinwindowhad
Upin holes,a11owingthe leakageof methanepressurantgas. i_
The thirdcase was a rupturedwindowin a chargedparticle _
experiment,which also depletedthe experiment'spres-
surantgas. The only similarincidentreportedprior _ _
to thisdata bankupdateinvolveda punctured"membrane"
in a micrometeoritedetector. The reasonfor the failure ,_.
was not determined.It is not knownhow much hardware
coveredin the data bank had "thin"windows,but pre-
sumablya numberof experimentsand scannersutilizedsuch E
devices. The increasein the numberof problemsreported
for themin thisupdateseems significant.
3. CatalystBed Susceptibilityto RFI: An anomalywas ob-
servedon thisup_te that has never beenseenon previous
data bank studies. That is, itwas reportedthata thruster
catalystbed was sensitiveto RFI undersome conditions.
This incidentoccurredseveraltimes,includingperiods
when varioustelemetrytransmittersand antennaswereac-tivated. It is also reportedthat thisinteractiondid
not havea seriousimpacton the mission. No further
informationwas available. Thereare other incidents
Binvolvingcatalystbeds in the databank. These include
a decreasein catalystbed resistanceafter heavyfir-
BIng; thisresistancedecrease]aterstabilized.Also,
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there llave been several Incidents tnw_]vlrlg degr,_dat1_,n
or loss oF thrust due to degradation of the catalyst b,,d.
There is no indication, however, tllat ,_ny ot these other
catalyst bed anomaI i es were even remote l.y assec iat_,d _i t _ ,_
susceptibility to RFI.
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